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FACILITATION AND REGULATION IN THE. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
EdwardI. Murphy*
"It is a big job, and why should anybody get it all under his belt the first
time out?" 1 Thus did Chief Draftsman Karl Llewellyn address some New York
critics of the Uniform Commercial Code. The pertinence (and perhaps the
impertinence) of Professor Llewellyn's cautionary remark will be evident to
anyone who has worked with the Code. The statute has no rival in our country
in terms of sheer displacement and modification of existing commercial law.
It is much more than a mere restatement or an effort "to make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions." 2 The effect of strict application alone
will be enormous; possible analogical application adds to the potential impact.'
That the draftsmen dealt with many basic questions and did not always
follow the path of least resistance is attested by the abundance of literature
generated by the Code. Heretofore, much of this writing has been concerned
with selling the product or with seeking to block a sale. But since more than
forty states have now adopted the statute, with a clean"sweep virtually assured,
additional efforts will be made to examine the provisions in various contexts
* Member, Illinois Bar; B.S., University of Illinois, 1949; LL.B., University of Illinois,
1951; Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law SchooL
1 [19541 1 N.Y. LAw REvisroN COMM'N ANN. REP. 159.
2 UNiFORM COMMERCrAL CODE § 1-102(2) (c). Code language throughout is that -of
the 1962 official text. Although the desire for uniformity may have been the principal motive
for initiation of the project, the Code being designed to replace seven of the uniform acts
prepared by one of the sponsoring organizations, and although the practical value of uniformity
may well be the major factor in widespread legislative acceptance, it is clear that normative
elements of law improvement are so dominant as to result in a considerable reorientation -of
legal doctrine. See, e.g., King, The New Conceptualism of the Uniform Commercial Code
10 ST. Lours U.L.J. 30 (1965); Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 MODERN L. REv. 167 '(1964); Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An
Essay on the jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VLL. L. Rxv. 213 (1966).
3 Collins, Contracts, in 1961 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 243; Murphy, Book Review, 37 Nomz'
DAM E LAWYER 465 (1962); Note, 65 COLuM. L. Rv. 880 (1965). The extent to which the.
Code is likely to be influential as a prestigious model for structuring general doctrine can be
perceived, for example, in the initial draft of the committee currently revising the Restatement,

of Contracts. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

CONTRACTS

(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
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and from different perspectives. I propose to examine the extent to which
Code rules and principles facilitate private autonomy, distinguishing such
facilitation from a regulatory approach which assigns rights and duties irrespective of private agreement.
Obviously, if one is intent upon prospecting for commercial law cast in
a regulatory mode, calculated to subordinate private choice to collective goals
or policies of legislative origin, there are more promising fields than the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code does not appear to be a regulatory measure
at all, certainly not in the sense of the typical insurance code or labor relations
statute.4 No one gainsays that the multitudinous legislative measures of the latter
type limit private autonomy; that is precisely what they are designed to do.
No comparable intention has been imputed to bodies in adopting the Code, the
Code dealing, in the main, with matters still left within the domain of private
agreement. If such a purpose is discernible in some Code provisions, it would
be all the more significant in the light of avowed purpose.
Analyzing the varying types of economic promises which are made and
kept, economist Harry Scherman made this observation: "I do not think there
is any single fact more important for men to recognize, with all its implications,
their individual well-being, as well as that of the
than this simple one -that
whole society, is determined by the volume of exchanges going on in the whole
society." (All italicized in original.) 5 Whatever the merits of this as a statement of universal principle, there can be no doubting that it is a presupposition
upon which the bulk of our traditional commercial law is predicated. Whether
derived from common law or statutory sources, this area of law is designed
primarily to protect and promote commercial exchange. The Uniform Commercial Code is not an exception. Section 1-102(2) states its "underlying
purposes and policies":
Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c)- to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
4 There is extensive legislative activity in the area of consumer protection, for instance,
most of it providing for regulation through administrative agencies. On the federal level there
is; notably, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 717 '(1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964), and-the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964). Far-reaching "truth in packaging"
and "truth in lending" bills are now pending in Congress. See, e.g., S. 985, 89th Gong., 1st
Sess. (1965) (packaging); S. 2275, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); (lending; for text see 111
CONG. Rie. 15848 (daily ed. July 12, 1965)). Many states, as well, have legislation of compaiable import,' including, in particular, consumer credit and disclosure statutes. See Note,
Economic Institutions and Value Survey: The Consumer in the Marketplace-A Survey
of the Law of Informed Buying, 38 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 555 (1963).
5

SCHERMAN,

THE PROMISES MEN LivE By 393 '(1938).
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It is noteworthy that the desired "expansion of commercial practices"

is to be accomplished through "agreement of the parties." This suggests another
bedrock concept traditionally present in the Anglo-American law governing
commercial transactions - freedom of contract. Under a regime of contract,
parties are recognized as possessing a high degree of autonomy as regards the
existence and content of legal relationships voluntarily assumed. There is, in
effect, private lawmaking.
Policy considerations which support this kind of legal order often are
unspecified in particular statutory enactments; they are usually presumed or
simply taken for granted. One reason for a lack of specification is that a significant and perhaps major portion of the law that implements the system is
to be found in court decisions rather than in laws or regulations emanating
from legislative or quasi-legislative bodies. Even in judicial opinion there is
little articulation of basic premises. Indeed, only when legislation was constitutionally challenged did the judges attempt to articulate the economic or philosophical foundations for freedom of contract, as in the past decades. when
regulatory measures of varying types were making their way through the courts.
For elaboration one did not ordinarily turn to the law book, but to the economic,
philosophical or political treatise. It has been asserted that freedom of
choice tends to bring about a greater diffusion of power, creating a condition
of pluralism in economic and political decision making. This, in turn, begets
and encourages private initiative and action, resulting in an increasing number
of transactions benefiting society as a whole. Many commentators emphasize
the diffusion of power aspect as a means of protecting individuals against
coercive, collective authority.'
The Code continues in the common law tradition of private autonomy,
stating in section 1-102(3):
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be
disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured
if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
The point is underscored in the following subsection:
The presence in certain provisions of this Act of the words "unless
otherwise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect
of other provisions may not be varied by agreement under subsection (3).
6

For typicality, the following will suffice:
It is the function of the free economy to allow human judgments and values
to be registered in the market place, and in an age of rapid technological innovation
we shall need its services more, not less. If war is too important to be left to the
generals, choice as to what shall be produced, saved, invested and consumed iit6o
important to be left to the scientists, or to any group of reputed "experts."
DAVENPORT, THE U.S. EcONOMY 175 (paperback ed. 1965).
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Removing all doubt as to general intendment, the drafters state in the comment to this section, "[F]reedom of contract is a principle of the Code."' Moreover, the three concluding sections of the first part of article 1 indicate that this
affirmation is not merely a ceremonial gesture. For example, section 1-105(1)
deals with the parties' power to choose applicable law:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears
a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the
parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or
nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act
applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
This section has been rightly characterized as "a clear victory for parties'
choice . . . a clear and important victory for freedom of contract, in an area
of great importance." 8 Its importance, of course, diminishes as the Code becomes common patrimony, but the decisive opting for freedom of choice in this
field is probative of general intendment.
Section 1-107 illustrates that some of the Code provisions implementing
the idea of private autonomy serve to displace common law doctrine which
tended to inhibit freedom of action:
Any claim or right arising out of an alleged breach can be discharged
in whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renunciation
signed and delivered by the aggrieved party.
It is evident that a recognition of freedom of contract would be hollow
indeed if the remedies available to the aggrieved party were inadequate. Section 1-106(1) sets the tone for later sections:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if
the other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special
nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this
Act or by other rule of law.
In short, the thrust of the Code, at least as manifested by the general provisions of article 1, is facilitation, not regulation. It remains to be seen to what
extent this theme is followed in other sections. Particular attention will be given
to article 2, the important sales article which treats many basic commercial
law questions.
I.

Agreement

Our traditional commitment to freedom encompasses a presumed permis7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102, comment 2.
8 Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 B.C. INn. & COM.

L. REv. 59, 60 (1960).
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sion to do whatever is not lawfully forbidden. We do not insist that the private
party justify his right to act; the public authority which seeks to restrain bears
the burden of justification. The recognition of private autonomy in contracting
is an authentic manifestation of this attitude. "Just as there must be 'freedom
for the thought that we hate,'" Professor Havighurst has reminded us, "so
there must also be, in a measure, freedom for the contract that we hate."'
The degree to which there was official protection and encouragement of
contractual freedom in nineteenth-century United States is without historical
parallel."0 But since then the trend has, indisputably, been to restrict the area
of private agreement, as vast segments of economic behavior have been brought
within the purview of statutory and administrative regulations. 1 Commercial
activity to which the Code is most intimately related is largely of the unregulated
type where the residue of respect for private agreement is the strongest.
Enforcement of Promises: Consideration
"In a developed economic order," Roscoe Pound observed, "the claim to

promised advantages is one of the most important of the individual interests
that press for recognition."' 2 He elaborated as follows: "Credit is a principal
form of wealth. It is a presupposition of the whole economic order that promises
will be kept. Indeed, the matter goes deeper. The social order rests upon

stability and predictability of conduct, of which keeping promises is a large
item."" Although there is no record of a legal system which has undertaken to
enforce all promises, there is yet to appear an organized society which has

repudiated altogether the concept of binding promise or contract. To be sure,
criteria of enforcement have varied. The sanction imposed has at times been
merely social or religious, rather than that prevailing today, a court command
to perform the promise or a judgment awarding money damages' Still, the
HAVIHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 124-25 (1961).
See, e.g., HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN
CENTURY UNITED STATES (paperback ed. 1964).

9

10

THE NINETEENTH-

11 For a brilliant description of this "spin-off" from contract, set against a Wisconsin
background, see FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965). For a critical evaluation
of this development, see DIETZE, IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY (1963).
12

3 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 88, at 162 (1959).

13

Ibid.
. . . [P]romises are everywhere, and it is rarely that one is ever broken. Big deals
in cotton futures are made in a gabble which no broker would ever dare say he
misunderstood. When an investment banker guarantees the underwriting of a new
issue of stock, he normally takes his licking without protest if something happens to
go wrong with the prospective market. It is the promise that sheet steel will be paid
for once the automobiles are sold, or that the installment on the car will go to the
finance company- or the bank when it is due, or that the rent will be paid out of the
proceeds of the crop, that enables men to gain untold benefits from the "long circuit of
energy" which credit creates.
CHAMBERLAIN, THE ROOTS OF CAPITaLISM 64 (rev. ed. 1965).
14

If one could not contract to dispose of one's labor and property in a complex

world, one could hardly be called a free man. In the modem context contracts are,
of course, enforceable by the State: it is the assurance of this, as well -as simple trust
in the common honesty and common pride of man, that permits thousands of halfcompleted transactions to take place in business every hour of the day. In ancient
law, however, there was nothing to compel the performance of a promise-and
"incomplete conveyances" required a religious sanction, ritualized by a solemn cere-

monial, to guarantee the fulfillment of an obligation.
CHAMBERLAIN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 62. In addition to the noted compulsions for keeping
promises, the prospect of legal sanction and common honesty, there is also obvious compulsion
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modem who insists "you gave me your word" or even "a bargain's a bargain,"
is hardly advancing novel doctrine. Pacta sunt servanda (agreements shall be
kept), or its equivalent, seems to be a characteristic human attitude.
Every legal system must provide guides for differentiating enforceable and
nonenforceable promises. The common law fundamental was that a promise
must be supported by consideration, something bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.' 5 Efforts to expand the area of enforcement have been,
by and large, unavailing. 6
. It might be thought that the insistence upon consideration would severely
restrict private autonomy. But for the most part, at least, this has not been the
case.- First, the area of real significance is that pertaining to commercial exchange where the quid pro quo is, of course, a prime ingredient. Instances of
nonenforcement have involved, with few exceptions, marginal transactions of
a noncommercial character. Second, the criteria of bargained-for exchange vest
the parties with broad discretion. There has been no attempt at judicial review
of the price or the terms so as to assure a "fair exchange." Rather, the courts
have often reiterated what is regarded as a staple of common law opinion in
this field: no inquiry will be made into the "adequacy" of the consideration.'
One exception must be noted, however. There has been one situation
involving a bargain in fact but viewed as nonenforceable because of inadequacy.
This' occurs where the so-called pre-existing duty rule is applied, a rule which
traces its pedigree to the famous case of Foakes v. Beer. 8 The promise or the
perfotmance of that which one is already legally obligated to perform, whether
the duty be owed to the other party or to a third person, will not suffice as
consideration. If A owes B one hundred dollars, A cannot obtain a discharge
by paying fifty dollars and obtaining B's promise to forgive the balance. Legally
speaking, it would seem, a bird in the hand is never worth two in the bush.
Whatever else may be said of this doctrine, its inhibiting effect must be acknowledged; it does not facilitate transactions. The Uniform Commercial Code
meets this problem head on in section 2-209(1):

derived from the fact that a failure to keep promises is, on the whole, economically disadvantageous. One's economic self-interest dictates keeping promises, for as one writer observed, "Old
promises must be infallibly carried out before new ones will be believed." SCHERMAN, op. crt.
supra note 5, at 29. "To say 'it pays to be honest' is wrong emphasis. The clearer view is that it
is.highly dangerous, economically, to be dishonest." (Italicized in original.) Id. at 71.
15 "Consideration for a promise is (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance,
orp (c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or (d) a return promise,
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
See generally Shatwell, The Doctrine of Considerationin the Modern Law, 1 SYDNEY L. REv.
289 (1954).
16 The courts have resisted enforcement predicated upon antecedent moral obligation.
Apart from promises to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations or discharged in bankruptcy, so-called moral consideration will seldom suffice. See, e.g., Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah
2d,433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961). There has been considerable implementation, however, of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel, the recognition of obligation arising from unbargained-for
reliance upon a promise. For a discussion of tendencies to extend the sphere of legally enfqrceable promises beyond the boundaries of a bargain theory of consideration, see 3 PouND,
op. cit. supra note 12, § 88, at 201-21.
17 4. . . T]he relative values of a promise and the consideration for it, do not affect the
svfficiqncy of consideration." RISTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 81 (1932).
18 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
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An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.
Here as elsewhere in the Code parties are enabled to do what they previously
could not have done, providing they exercise good faith.'0
Another manifestation of this approach is the treatment, in section 2-306
(1), of output and requirements contracts. At common law it was not unusual
for attempts to construct commercial agreements of this type to fail for indefiniteness or lack of consideration. The Code insures enforceability by ascribing-to
the parties an intention to give the terms used a definite meaning.. Section
2-306(1) provides:
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or
the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements
as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate
to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements
may be tendered or demanded.
Simply because there is a promise not to revoke an offer does not preclude
revocation under common law. This promise, the same as any other promise,
must have something additional, typically consideration, before it becomes a
binding commitment. The common law provided no "firm offer" apart from
a standard option arrangement; the Code does. Section 2-205 reads:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which
by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for
lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a
reasonable time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed
three months; but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the
offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.
Private autonomy is enhanced to the extent that these legal barriers to
promissory obligation are removed or neutralized. The lack of consideration
defense of one who promises to hold an offer open, or accept a lesser price, or
supply requirements, or give up a claim or right arising out of an alleged
breach, buttresses the private lawmaking power of the parties and expedites
commercial transactions, one of the principal reasons advanced for recogniton
..
of that power2
19 Section 1-107 is complementary: "Any claim or right arising out of an alleged breach
can be discharged in whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed and delivered by the aggrieved party."
20 Of comparable import is § 2-306(2), which governs exclusive dealing arrangements:
A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in
the kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller
to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote
their sale.

One other Code provision dispensing with the consideration requirement is contained in the
article on letters of credit. Section 5-105 reads: "No consideration is necessary to establish
a credit or to enlarge or otherwise modify its terms."
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Offer and Acceptance: Indefiniteness
Closely related to the removal of barriers to carrying out the manifested
intention of the parties is the enactment of rules designed to save a transaction
despite some degree of uncertainty of expressed terms. Section 2-306, discussed
above, is illustrative. This gap-filling or implied term technique is utilized
throughout the Code.2
"It is fundamental that courts will not enforce a contract which is vague,
indefinite, or uncertain, nor will they make a new contract for the parties." 22 This
statement or a paraphrase has appeared in countless decisions and epitomizes the
judicial attitude regarding indefiniteness. There has been, in general, a marked
disinclination to fill any gaps or resolve uncertainties by the enforcement of some
judicially approved standard, such as reasonable price, and save the purported
agreement. Similarly, despite evident intention to be bound, "agreements to
agree" have usually been held to be unenforceable. It has been argued that this
attitude is anachronistic, being at variance with commercial expectations and
inadequate to satisfy legitimate commercial needs.2" Adverse business effects
have, in part, been mitigated through utilization of types of escalator clauses.
Thus, rent is geared to gross receipts, wage scales to a cost of living index, price
to specified market quotations.24 There is reason to believe that a change in
prevailing attitude will not be long in coming. Most significantly, the Code
breaks decisively with the traditional approach. Section 2-204(3), which states
the principle as to "open term" agreements underlying other sections, provides:
Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does
not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract
and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
This is a sweeping provision, amplified by the following official comment:
The test is not certainty as to what the parties were to do nor as to the
exact amount of damages due the plaintiff. Nor is the fact that one or
more terms are left to be agreed upon enough of itself to defeat an otherwise adequate agreement. Rather, commercial standards on the point of
"indefiniteness" are intended to be applied, this Act making provision
elsewhere for25missing terms needed for performance, open price, remedies
and the like.

21 Foremost is § 1-203, which reads: "Every contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." This general provision
is buttressed by more specific provisions, the effect of which is to read into expressions of the
parties certain terms or obligations. One notable example is § 1-208:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate
payment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or
"when he deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed
to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the
prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of
good faith is on the party against whom the power has been exercised.
22 Hughes Realty Co. v. Breitbach, 98 N.W.2d 374, 376 (N. Dak. 1959).
23 Prosser, Open Price in Contracts for the Sale of Goods, 16 MINN. L. REV. 733 (1932).
See VOLD, SALES § 10 '(2d ed. 1959).
24 FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 87-89 (1947); Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1337 (1959).
25 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-204, comment.
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The important "open price" section is 2-305, which provides in part:
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even
though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price
at the time for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to
agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or
other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency
and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for
him to fix in good faith.
Related sections pertain to place of delivery (section 2-308), time for performance (section 2-309), credit terms (section 2-310) and options in
performance (section 2-311). Section 2-311(1) provides:
An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently definite (subsection
(3) of Section 2-204) to be a contract is not made invalid by the fact that
it leaves particulars of performance to be specified by one of the parties. Any
such specification must be made in good faith and within limits set by commercial reasonableness.
Offer and Acceptance: Mechanics of Assent
As "master of his offer," the offeror may not only stipulate the terms of the
contract but also specify the manner of acceptance. In the standard bilateral
contract, where the offeror seeks a commitment (promise) from the offeree,
he may indicate how the return promise may be manifested. He may demand
a signed writing; he may require that the return promise be actually communicated to him before obligation arises; he may even prescribe a "promissory
act" as the permissible mode of acceptance 6 If a unilateral contract is contemplated (where, typically, the offeror promises to do something in exchange for an
act or forbearance by the offeree), the proferred consideration of the offeree and
his acceptance are the same. His act or forbearance is both a manifestation of
assent and the consideration for the offeror's promise.
Over the years a great deal of litigation has arisen dealing with various
aspects of the acceptance problem, and for the most part it has been resolved by
deduction from broad principles. Many have argued that although the conclusions reached may possess logical validity, they do not comport with reason26 E.g., Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green, 83 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 1955) ("commencing
performance of the work" held to constitute acceptance of offer for bilateral contract).
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able commercial expectation and desire. For example, suppose a seller receives an
order from the buyer, calling for prompt shipment of certain goods. Would
a return promise of the seller to ship bind the parties to a contract? Or would
only actual shipment suffice? And in either case, what effect, if any, would the
shipment of nonconforming goods have? Section 2-206 (1)affords clarification:
Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in
the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current
shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either
by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current
shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods, but such
a shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute an
acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that
is offered only as an accommodation to the
the shipment
27
buyer.
Since it removes uncertainties present in prior law, subsection (1) (b) has
the general effect of expediting transactions. Moreover, it deals decisively with
the problem which Professor Hawkland has styled the "unilateral contract
trick. ' 28 He gives the example of B's wire reading: "Send me 1000 widgets
Tuesday." If this is treated as an offer to enter into a unilateral contract, and
S ships 1000 defective widgets, has he breached his contract? The buyer would
so insist, but seller would contend otherwise. His position would be (and here
the "trickiness" seems evident) that the offer specified "1000 widgets," and
only by the shipment of goods conforming to this would a contract come into
being. The shipment of 1000 defective widgets did not conform to the offer
and was inoperative as an acceptance. Presumably under the Code this escape
valve is closed.
There is another difficulty arising in the unilateral contract area (a prolific
source of conceptual versus practical conflicts) for which the Code treatment
does not afford such clarification. Consider the traditional classroom hypothetical: "If you will climb the flagpole outside and hang this flag at the top, I
will give you five dollars. As you are midway in your ascent, I yell up at you:
'Offer revoked.' What legal recourse, if any, do you have?" None, according
(2):27

28
(1964).

The general character of the Code sections in this area can be seen in §§ 2-204 (1),
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made
in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such
a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even
though the moment of its making is undetermined.
1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 33
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to older opinion, the reason being that no contract arises until the act requested
as acceptance was completed. This view has been modified significantly. While
rationales may differ, the effect is the same: after part performance by the
offeree, the offer becomes irrevocable. But it has been urged that the modification has itself spawned a condition which needs amelioration. Originally the
offeree undertaking to perform the act requested was at the mercy of the offeror,
for the offeror could revoke any time prior to full completion. The modification
of this was highly advantageous to the offeree, who was, after part performance,
not susceptible to the offeror's power of revocation. While the offeror is not able
to revoke, there is no obligation on the part of the offeree to continue, a situation
disadvantageous to the offeror. It may be that section 2-206(2) was aimed
at this problem as presented in the sale of goods area:
Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable
mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within
a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before
acceptance.
Professor Hawkland is of the opinion that such may have been the intention
of the drafters but that the attempt falls short of accomplishing the objective. As
he sees it:
The lack of equality in a state of affairs in which the offeror can be
bound, while the offeree is free, would seem to require a new rule providing
that the beginning of performance does not bar the power of revocation,
unless the offeree notifies the offeror that a start has been made and surrenders his right to cease performing. There is some reason to think that
subsection 2-206(2) purports to formulate such a rule, but the plain meaning
of that section seems to indicate that the offeree need notify the offeror
that a start has been made, only "where the beginning of the requested
performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance." If the offer is clearly
one to enter into a unilateral contract, with completion unambiguously
indicated as the accepting event, the beginning of a requested performance
is not a reasonable mode of acceptance, and subsection
2-206(2) would
29
not give the offeror additional protection in such a case.
It is often said that an acceptance must be "unequivocal." '3 "An offeror
is entitled to know in clear terms whether the offeree accepts his proposal. It is not
enough that the words of a reply justify a probable inference of assent.""1
Moreover, the offeree cannot pick and choose among the terms, agreeing here and
disagreeing there, and then assert the existence of an operative acceptance. If
he varies or changes the terms, he makes, at best, a counteroffer. There can
then be no contract until agreement is reached as to those changes, i.e., until the
counteroffer itself has been accepted. 2" In section 2-207 the Code breaks some29 Id. at 35.
30 E.g., Venters v. Stewart, 261 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Ky. App. 1953).
31 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 58, comment a (1932).
32 There is a considerable body of law devoted to differentiating a "conditional acceptance," which is really no acceptance at all, from a genuine acceptance accompanied by mere
inquiries, requests or suggestions of the offeree. Although a reply which purports to be an
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what with tradition, presumably in an attempt to reflect what is believed to be
the prevailing business consensus:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on
assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the
contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of
the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of
the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under
any other provisions of this Act.
Under this section "a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or
a written confirmation" may operate as an acceptance even though "it states
terms additional to or different from those offered." "The additional terms
are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract," which the offeror
can either accept or reject. However, and this is a striking innovation, between
merchants such additional terms may become part of the contract without further
manifestation of assent by the original offeror. s" This may be the result of
subsection (2); the early returns indicate some judicial hesitation. For example,
in Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., a 1962 decision of the First Circuit, 4
the buyer submitted an order for a drum emulsion, which contained the stateacceptance but adds qualifications or requires performance of conditions is not an acceptance
but a counteroffer, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 60 (1932), "an acceptance which requests
a change or addition to the terms of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance
is made to depend on an assent to the changed or added terms." Id. § 62.
33 The drafters of the Code have expressed the hope that § 2-207 will help alleviate
some of the difficulties surrounding what has aptly been called the "battle of the forms." To
illustrate: the purchaser submits terms favorable to himself on his "purchaser order," with a
request that the seller assent to those terms. But the seller, using his "sales order" or "invoice," ignores the purchaser's form and seeks to secure the latter's approval of different terms.
And so it may go, back and forth. For an account of this business phenomenon, see FULLER,
op. cit. supra note 24, at 178-80.
34 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
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merit: "End use; wet pack spinach bags." Upon receipt of the order the seller
prepared an "acknowledgment" and an "invoice" simultaneously. The acknowledgment was mailed the same day and was received no later than the
goods. The invoice was presumably received a day or two after the goods. Each
document bore the following in conspicuous type on its face: "All goods sold
without warranties, express or implied, and subject to the terms on reverse
side." The buyer did not protest the seller's attempt to disclaim warranty
liability, and in due course paid for the emulsion and used it. The case turned
upon whether all warranties were excluded by the seller's acknowledgment. The
plaintiff (buyer) based his case on section 2-207, claiming that the acknowledgment was "a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation" which operated as an acceptance despite the inclusion of the warranty
disclaimer. He contended that the disclaimer became merely a proposal "for
addition to the contract." Moreover, since the additional term would "materially
alter" the contract, it did not become a part thereof automatically. Finally, since
the buyer did not expressly assent to the disclaimer, it did not become a part of
the contract.
On the face of it, the buyer's argument appears to be ironclad. The court
disagreed. It refused to regard the "acknowledgment" as an acceptance; hence,
the acknowledgment, containing the disclaimer provision, was the offer which
the buyer accepted by accepting the goods. The court seemed troubled by the
section, which it said "is not too happily drafted." 5 It stated:
If plaintiffs contention is correct that a reply to an offer stating additional
conditions unilaterally burdensome upon the offeror is a binding acceptance
of the original offer plus simply a proposal for the additional conditions,
the statute would lead to an absurdity.
Obviously no offeror will sub3
sequently assent to such conditions. 6
The court does not make clear whether it believed the plaintiff's contention
was without statutory warrant or whether the statutory provision was absurd
and should not be implemented judicially. If Roto-Lith is typical of the judicial
response to this section, the overall effect will not be to facilitate agreement.
The judicial gloss may well neutralize the apparent legislative intent.
The foregoing reflects a general Code policy of deemphasizing traditional
offer and acceptance rules which can be used to defeat binding obligation despite
overall manifestation of intent to the contrary. The treatment is far from comprehensive, nor are the provisions drafted in such a way as to preclude judicial
obfuscation. Still, a stance is taken, and this is a foundation for further
development.
Interpretation;"Gap Filling";Construction:"Making a Contractfor the Parties"
The time has long since passed when common law judges purported to
ascertain the actual intentions of contracting parties. Rather, parties are
presumed to mean what they say; the objective theory of contracts is dominant.
35 Id. at 500.

36

Iid.
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The emphasis is upon the outward expressions of the parties, considered in the
full context of the transaction. There is a similar emphasis in the interpretation
of contracts. The initial attempt is to find the plain meaning of the words used,
ascribing to the words their ordinary, dictionary meaning. But there is, of course,
a "breaking point .. .beyond which no language can be forced,"" resulting
in some modification of the plain meaning rule. A word or phrase may not have
a "plain meaning"; a choice must, therefore, be made from among alternative
meanings." The choice may be dictated by the context or by some type of
special usage. There may be several dictionary meanings, including as well that
given in advance by the parties, their own private code as it were. Hence, it
often happens that courts will rely on various extrinsic aids in the process of
interpretation. One such aid is the practical construction of the parties themselves, evidenced by their course of performance. In this regard, section
2-208(1) of the Code provides:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance
accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine
the meaning of the agreement.
The Code provides other extrinsic aids of a general character. Section
1-205, Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade, is the most significant:
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions
and other conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as
facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade
code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in
the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or
should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms
of an agreement.
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as con37 Learned Hand, J., in Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, 239 Fed. 976, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
38 See generally Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 833 (1964).
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sistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express
terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade and course of
dealing controls usage of trade.
(5) An applicable usage of trade in the place where any part of
performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to
that part of the performance.
(6) Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is
not admissible unless and until he has given the other party such notice
as the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise to the latter.
The above provision relating to "course of dealing" does not seem to go
beyond the well-recognized view that the totality is to be examined-not words
alone, but the context as well. This is not inconsistent with respect for the
"agreement of the parties," as indicated by outward manifestation. The "usage
of trade" provision is somewhat different. Arguably, it is more than a difference
of degree. For example, for a binding contract it is not essential that there be
proof that the particular parties were aware of the usage. The requirement
is that it have such "regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction
in question." This affords the court some leeway, and suggests the possibility of
holding parties to standards of which they not only did not intend to impose but
of which they were completely unaware.
In a broad sense the usage of trade mandate may simply be a reflection of
"Lombard Street dictating to Westminster Hall," a recognition of both the
legitimacy and desirability of adapting commercial law to the needs, desires and
practices of the business community. The drafters seem to underscore this:
in the following comment:
Under the requirement of subsection (2) full recognition is thus available
for new usages and for usages currently observed by the great majority of
decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut comers do not agree.
There is room also for proper recognition of usage agreed upon by
merchants in trade codes.39
Whether for good or for ill it must be recognized that while this may facilitate
transactions it also encourages some judicial regulation. The transaction "agreed
upon" will be held to be of a certain type, as found by the court in its consideration of trade usage.
This is not a new problem. Indeed, it may be but one aspect of the most
basic problem which frequently confronts a court in its avowed attempt to
implement the agreement of the parties. No matter how much care goes into
the drafting of a document, there will almost inevitably be gaps, terms which are
imperfectly articulated or matters not touched upon at all. What is the court
to do? It may let the agreement fail for want of sufficient definiteness, or try
39

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

1-205,

comment

5.
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to facilitate the transaction by the imposition of judicially prescribed terms. The
former approach is rejected in the Code. For instance, section 2-204(3) states
that "even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not
fail for indefinitness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there
is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." But "gap filling"
by the courts lays it open to charge of "making the contract for the parties."
The Code has opted for one position over the other; so, it would seem,
have the courts. There has been a tendency for courts not only to "interpret"
contracts in the ordinary sense, but to "construct" terms as well.4" It is not
accidental that a leading opinion dealing with so-called "constructive conditions," Kingston v. Preston,4 was authored by Lord Mansfield, a jurist noted
for his assimilation of mercantile law and custom into the mainstream of the
common law.
Judicial activism of this type need not, and usually does not, involve a
determined disregard for the "intentions of the parties." A masterful treatment
by Judge Cardozo is illustrative. In Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent" plaintiff,
after building a country residence for the defendant at a cost of upwards of
$77,000, sued to recover the contract balance of $3,483.46. The defendant
argued that the plaintiff breached the contract in that the specifications called
for iron pipe for the plumbing work to be "of Reading manufacture" and pipe
of another manufacturer was installed. The improper substitution of "Cohoes
pipe" for "Reading pipe," shown by the evidence to be of equal quality, resulted
from the oversight of plaintiff's subcontractor. The defendant did not learn of
the substitution until after most of it had been encased within the walls. To
replace pipe at that point would have meant the expensive demolition of substantial parts of the completed structure.
Did the failure to install the Reading pipe constitute the breach of a condition to be followed by a forfeiture? Judge Cardozo, speaking for the Court of
Appeals of New York, said it did not. He readily acknowledged that the
plaintiff did not fill the measure of his contractual duty, but he declined to hold
that the plaintiff was thereby disqualified from collecting the balance. The
allowance of damages, in this instance measured by difference in value rather
than cost of replacement, was all that defendant could rightfully demand.
Did the court thereby disregard the intentions of the parties and improperly
"make a contract for the parties"? The simple fact is that the parties did not
express themselves on the precise point. There was no "agreement of the parties"
in that sense. Cardozo referred to similar problems which arise in differentiating
promised performances which are dependent and those which are independent,
or between promises and conditions. In resolving these problems, he said, courts
rely upon "considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable intention."
(Emphasis added.)"' He elaborated:
From the conclusion that promises may not be treated as dependent to the
40

For a definitive treatment of this subject, see Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Con-

tracts, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1942).
41 2 Doug. 684, 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 433, 437 (1773).
42 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).

43 Id. at 242, 129 N.E. at 890.
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extent of their uttermost minutiae without a sacrifice of justice, the progress
is a short one to the conclusion that they may not be so treated without
a perversion of intention. Intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed
to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable. (Emphasis added.) 44
Thus it is that in the process of "interpretation," or "construction" to be more
precise, the courts will often find matters to be within the "agreement of the
parties" which the parties themselves evidently did not consider at all. In doing so
courts must rely upon "considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable
intention," to use Cardozo's descriptive language. Inevitably there is a normative
element in the decision, i.e., the court must prescribe what is "fair," "just,"
"reasonable," etc. "Intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in
contemplation the reasonable and probable."
The Uniform Commercial Code not only continues this tradition; it significantly extends it. Apart from more general provisions, such as 1-203 (obligation of good faith), 1-205 (course of dealing and usage of trade), 1-208
(option to accelerate at will) and 2-208 (course of performance or practical
construction), there are a multitude of specific provisions which, in effect, fill
gaps left because of the absence of a term or an incomplete description thereof.
Some of these have already been noted, e.g., the "open price term" in section
2-305 and related provisions touching the general problem of definiteness in
contracting. There are others which are clustered around various important segments of the sales contract, e.g., the delivery obligation of the seller, the payment
obligation of the buyer and the risk of loss.
Section 2-301 states the general obligations of parties to a sales contract
as follows:
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the
buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract.
But what are the particulars of each obligation? Where is delivery to be made?
When? Must all goods be tendered in a single delivery? When is payment due?
Who bears risk of loss? These are matters which can and should be expressly
provided for in the agreement, but often they are not. If such an omission occurs,
how is the gap to be filled?
Concerning the "delivery obligation," the following are pertinent: 2-307
(delivery in single lot or several lots); 2-308 (absence of specified place for
delivery); 2-503 (manner of seller's tender of delivery); 2-504 (shipment by
seller); and 2-309 (absence of specific time provisions). 4' Similarly, there
are particularizations of the buyer's "payment obligation"; 2-3 10 (open time for
payment or running of credit; authority to ship under reservation); 2-511
(tender of payment by buyer; payment by check); 2-512 (payment by buyer
before inspection); and 2-5 13 (buyer's right to inspection of goods).
Who suffers the loss if the goods contracted for are lost, destroyed or
44 Id. at 242, 129 N.E. at 891.
45
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damaged? Here, too, the parties may by agreement expressly allocate this risk
in advance. But often, of course, they do not do so, and it devolves upon the
court to make the risk assignment. The approach of the common law and the
Uniform Sales Act is well known-risk followed "title." Whoever "owned"
the goods at the time of the loss had to bear the burden. This, in turn, depended
upon the intention of the parties. But the obvious difficulty was that the parties
often gave little, if any, hint of their intention in this regard. Accordingly, the
Uniform Sales Act established rules for ascertaining intention, which were
applicable "unless a different intention appear[ed]."4 6
One can discern in the Uniform Sales Act, and in the common law opinions
which it followed, a strong emphais upon the primacy of intention. Indeed, even
when there is a clear realization that the parties had no intention in the subjective sense, the rules were formulated so as to purport to implement such
intention. Even when the courts actually added to what the parties expressed,
they did so with apparent reluctance and under the guise of effectuating intention.
This fictional approach has been abandoned in other areas, and it was to be
expected that it would be abandoned here as well. The Code provides for gap
filling as did the Uniform Sales Act, but it does not seek to create the illusion
that it is thereby implementing actual intention. The comment to section 2-101,
sets the tone of the Code treatment of this and related questions:
The arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for sale and
the various steps of its performance. The legal consequences are stated as
following directly from the contract and action taken under it without
resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as being
the determining factor.
The Code treatment lessens the importance of the concept of title in favor
of a narrow issue approach detailing specific legal consequences for different
factual situations. Important examples of these provisions are those relating
to risk of loss (sections 2-509 and 2-510), the seller's right to an action for
the price (section 2-709), and the buyer's right to obtain the goods (section
2-716). In handling matters of this type, the attorney must look first for a
Code provision determinative of the particular issue at hand. Only when there
is no such specific provision applicable will resort be had to the general provision,
section 2-401, which establishes guidelines for the location of title.4"
In the ordinary bilateral contract, where there are "promises for an agreed
exchange,"4 the parties exchange promises, but only as a means of facilitating an
exchange of performances. Thus, A promises to sell x goods; B promises to pay y
dollars. To facilitate the overall purpose, the exchange of goods for dollars, the
46

UNIFORM SALES ACT § 19. For example, rule 1 of that section reads:
Where there is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods, in a deliverable
state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and
it is immaterial whether the time of payment, or the time of delivery, or both, be

postponed.
47 The Code makes a major contribution in this area by recognizing that a buyer obtains
an insurable interest in goods upon their "identification." See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-501.
48 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 266 (1932).
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law "implies" or "constructs" conditions.49 Tender by A is a condition to his right
to the money; tender by B is a condition to his right to the goods. The Code is in
accord. Section 2-507(1) reads:
Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to accept the
goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for them. Tender
entitles the seller to acceptance of the goods and to payment according to
the contract.
In the same way, section 2-511 (1) stipulates:
Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a condition to the seller's
duty to tender and complete any delivery.
The foregqing would, of course, not apply in the common situation where
credit is extended to the buyer--since the parties have "agreed" that payment

should not condition the right to recieve the goods. But even here, events may
occur which will have the effect of excusing performance by one party until
further action is taken by the other. What, for example, of the case where one
party's expectation of receiving due performance has been impaired? Section
2-609, an extremely important Code section, deals with this matter:
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the
other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired.
When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance
of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due
performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially
reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received
the agreed return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity
and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according
to commercial standards.
49

The principles underlying the constructive condition of exchange have been
more or less influential in English and American law for several centuries. Their
articulate recognition has been obscured by a faulty terminology ("implied") which
confused them with genuine inferences of intention inadequately expressed. The
construction of conditions on this principle is limited, on the one side, by the principle that courts cannot make contracts for the parties (freedom of contract
implies the possibility of contracting foolishly) and, on the other side, by the principle that unjust enrichment and "forfeiture" are to be avoided. The underlying
conception is that bargain is a means of assuring and effectuating exchange, and
that exchange (by some means) is a necessary mechanism in the economic organization of society by division of labor and specialization of function. Exchange by
bargain (always limited to some extent by the environmental framework of law and
usage) brings the bargainers into competing and even antagonistic relations with
each other, since each seeks the satisfaction'of his wants by a minimum of outlay,
harm and risk. The effectuation of exchange is, however, not merely a means of
satisfying the wants of the contracting parties; it also functions in the total economy
to satisfy the wants of others in society. Thus a social interest in having the job
done, and done well, is a part of the policy of the law of contracts.
Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUm. L. REV. 903, 928 (1942).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prejudice
the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future
performance.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a
reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance
as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the contract.
The thinking behind this section is detailed in the official commentary:
The section rests on the recognition of the fact that the essential purpose
of a contract between commercial men is actual performance and they do
not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the right to win a
lawsuit and that a continuing sense of reliance and security that the promised
performance will be forthcoming when due, is an important feature of the
bargain. If either the willingness or the ability of a party to perform declines
materially between the time of contracting and the time for performance,
the other party is threatened with the loss of a substantial part of what he
has bargained for. A seller needs protection not merely against having to
deliver on credit to a shaky buyer, but also against having to procure and
manufacture the goods, perhaps turning down other customers. Once he
has been given reason to believe that the buyer's performance has become
uncertain, it is an undue hardship to force him to continue his own performance. Similarly, a buyer who believes that the seller's deliveries have
become uncertain cannot safely wait for the due date of performance when
he has been buying to assure himself of materials for his current manufacturing or to replenish his stock of merchandise. 50
Failure to provide the required assurance constitutes "a repudiation of the
contract" the effect of which is to afford the aggrieved party alternatives stipulated
in section 2-610, dealing with anticipatory repudiation:
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a performance
not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the
contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by
the repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Section
2-711), even though he has notified the repudiating party
that he would await the latter's performance and has urged
retraction; and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in
accordance with the provisions of this Article on the seller's
right to identify goods to the contract notwithstanding breach
or to salvage unfinished goods (Section 2-704).
50
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The landmark decision which developed the idea of anticipatory breach

is Hochster v. De La Tour,51 decided in 1853. On May 11 the employer repudiated a contract entered into the previous April, which called for the employee to
begin work on June 1. The action was brought on May 22, i.e., prior to the time
when performance under the contract was to begin. The English court held this
not to have been premature. The renunciation could be treated as a breach of
contract, dispensing with the necessity of waiting until the time set for the performance by the employer.
Lord Campbell advanced two rationales in his opinion. One was that unless
the employee was permitted an immediate right of action he would be obliged,
in order to preserve his cause of action, to remain idle until the date set for the
work to commence. The court was of the opinion that "If the plaintiff has no
remedy for breach of the contract unless he treats the contract as in force, and
acts upon it down to the 1st June 1852, it follows that, till then, he must
,,52 It
enter into no employment which will interfere with his promise ....
did not follow that refusal to recognize an immediate cause of action required
continued maintenance of readiness to perform. The court might have recognized
the repudiation as discharging the employee from his duty, i.e., as providing him
with a defense, without at the same time according him a present right to sue. But
the court apparently did not consider the available alternative, and this inhibited
future development. In general, courts have refused to apply the doctrine of
anticipatory breach where the enforced idleness feature was not present, as for
example, where the aggrieved party has already rendered his performance. One
would think the case for one who has already performed his part of the bargain
all the more appealing, but such persons have fared poorly in the cases. It is
ironic that Hochsteritself provided a most persuasive theory of recovery for them.
In his opinion Lord Campbell observed:
[W]here there is a contract to do an act on a future day, there is a
...
relation constituted between the parties in the meantime by the contract,
and.., they impliedly promise that in the meantime neither will5311o anything to the prejudice of the other inconsistent with" that relation.
This relation argument would, of course, be appropriate whether an aggrieved
party has completed his performance or not. The finding of "implied promise"
not to "do anything to the prejudice of the other inconsistent with their relation,"
actually makes the default "present" rather than "anticipatory." This is as it
should be, since it is demonstrable that a repudiation can inflict present injury.
The Code abandons the principal judicial limitation of anticipatory breach,
in that a remedy is available "when either party repudiates the contract with
respect to a performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair
the value of the contract." The -Code does not state its rationale, but its attitude
is certainly consistent wih recognition of a general obligation to exercise good
faith and a policy of encouraging contract performance. 4
51 2 Ell. & Bl. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853).
52 Id. at 689, 118 Eng. Rep. at 926.
53 Ibid.
54 Section 2-611(1), which gives the repudiating party an opportunity to retract "unless
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Turning from the "anticipatory" to the "present," will any breach justify
nonperformance by the innocent party? Jacob & Youngs, Inc., v. Kent, discussed previously, gave a negative answer, based upon "considerations partly of
justice and partly of presumable intention." The elaboration of a doctrine of
substantial performance is one of the most striking examples of "courts making
contracts for parties." The vast majority of substantial performance cases involve
construction or building contracts, where the circumstances are particularly
appropriate for application of the doctrine. The structure is attached to the realty,
and a return is not feasible. In such a contract the general judicial disfavor of
forefeiture and unjust enrichment strongly impels mitigation. Since this is
ordinarily not the case in contracts for the sale of goods, it no doubt helps to
account for the sparing use of the substantial performance doctrine in mercantile
transactions.55 Certainly an effort to foist nonconforming goods upon the buyer
-which are allegedly "just as good" as those contracted for-is doomed to
failure. On the other hand, the principle of de minimis non curat lex may
absolve a seller from a trivial failure, and occasional help has been forthcoming
for a seller who has manufactured goods to buyer's special order and would
suffer heavy losses if substantially conforming goods were not accepted. The
basic pattern, however, is to demand strict, literal compliance. Variations from
this pattern have usually involved some minor variance from stipulations governing time of shipment.56
The Code's treatment is rather nebulous. Section 2-601 seemingly adopts
the "rule of perfect tender," in that if goods fail in any respect to conform to the
contract the buyer may reject the whole:
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment
contracts (Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections
on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the
goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract,
the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c)

accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.

The decisive rejection of the doctrine of substantial performance must be
read, however, against the background of other provisions which tend to limit
a buyer's right of rejection." For example, section 2-601 does not purport
the aggrieved party has since the repudiation cancelled or materially changed his position or
otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation final," is consistent with this policy.
Understandably, retraction must include any assurance justifiably demanded by § 2-609.
55 See 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 225a (rev. ed. 1948); Note, Application of the Doctrine
of Substantial Performance in the Law of Sales, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 1021 (1933).
56 E.g., LeRoy Dyal Co. v. Allen, 161 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1947).
57 For a detailed discussion of Code intricacies relative to the buyer's right to reject nonconforming tenders, as well as the seller's right to cancel, see Peters, Remedies for Breach of
Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for
Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 206-27 (1963). See Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection,
97 U. PA. L. REv. 457 (1949).
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to deal with the effect of breach in. an installment contract. That is covered by
section 2-612, which provides:
(1) An "installment contract" is one which requires or authorizes the
delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though
the contract contains a clause "each delivery is a separate contract" or its
equivalent.
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming
if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment
and cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required
documents; but if the non-conformity does not fall within subsection (3) and
the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must accept that

installment.
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or more
installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is
a breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract if
he accepts a non-conforming installment without seasonably notifying of
cancellation or if he brings an action with respect only to past installments
or demands performance as to future installments.
This section minimizes the effect of the breach in terms of the relationship of the
parties, and thereby limits, in practice, the buyer's right to reject. The buyer
cannot claim a right to* rescind or cancel respecting future performance. The
measure of the limitation is indicated by the official comment:
Whether the non-conformity in any given installment justifies cancellation
as to the future depends, not on whether such non-conformity indicates an
intent or likelihood that the future deliveries will also be defective, but
whether the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of the whole
contract.58
Consider also the mitigating effect of section 2-508, pertaining to opportunity
given the seller to "cure" the improper tender or delivery:
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because
non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the
seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure -and may
then within the contract time make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller
had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without
money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a
further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.
58

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-612, comment 6.
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The foregoing is consonant with the general policy of the Code which
looks "to preserving the deal wherever possible.59 Implementation of this policy
can be seen also in a related section, 2-605, which covers the waiver of buyer's
objections by failure to particularize:
( 1 ) The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a particular
defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes him from
relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection or to establish breach
(a) where the seller could have cured it if stated seasonably; or
(b) between merchants when the seller has after rejection made
a request in writing for a full and final written statement of
all defects on which the buyer proposes to rely.
(2) Payment against documents made without reservation of rights
precludes recovery of the payment for defects apparent on the face of the
documents.
What if, after formation of the contract, it becomes "impossible" for one
party to perform? Or if not "impossible," would a change of circumstances
frustrating the objective or purpose sought to be attained excuse one's performance? If the device of contract is to have real utility there must be a general
judicial attitude compelling performance of contractual undertakings or providing
compensatory damages for breach. Pactasunt servanda! It should not, therefore,
be surprising that courts manifest an unwillingness to excuse a contracting party
simply because performance is difficult, unprofitable or even impossible in some
sense. As indicated in a celebrated dictum from an early common law decision,
...when the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident
by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his
e°
contractY
A considerable part of the judicial effort in the implication and construction
of conditions has involved problems relating to so-called "impossibility of performance" and "frustration of purpose.""1 In this area as well a common pattern can be
detected. Initial strictness gives way to implied terms, eventuating in obligations
imposed by law or constructive conditions. The Code encourages this development and formulates specific rules. For instance, section 2-614 relates to substituted performance:
(1) Where without fault of either party the agreed berthing, loading,
59 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-605, comment 2.
60 Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 27, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647).
61 See generally Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance,
18 MICH. L. RE,. 589 (1920). For an extensive annotation, see Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12
(1962).
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or unloading facilities fail or an agreed type of carrier becomes unavailable
or the agreed manner of delivery otherwise becomes commercially
impracticable but a commercially reasonable substitute is available, such
substitute performance must be tendered and accepted.
(2) If the- agreed means or manner of payment fails because of
domestic or foreign governmental regulation, the seller may withhold or
stop delivery unless the buyer provides a means or manner of payment
which is commercially a substantial equivalent. If delivery has already
been taken, payment by the means or in the manner provided by the
regulation discharges the buyer's obligation unless the regulation is discriminatory, oppressive or predatory.
This provision is buttressed by two other sections which pertain to circumstances
providing an excuse for performance. Section 2-613, dealing with "casualty
to identified goods," is largely congruent with prior law. In contrast, section
2-615, Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions, seems destined to have
a reach considerably beyond that of common law cases:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and
subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a
seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance
as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence
of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic
government regulation or order whether or not it later proves
to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a
part of the seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate
production and deliveries among his customers but may at
his option include regular customers not then under contract
as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He
may so allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be
delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is required under
paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made available
for the buyer.
The Code does not distinguish between impossibility of performance
("frustration of performance") and frustration of purpose ("frustration of
venture"). In this respect, the Code commentators observe:

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The first test for excuse under this Article in terms of basic assumption
is a familiar one. The additional test of commercial impracticability (as
contrasted with "impossibility," "frustration of performance" or "frustration of the venture") has been adopted in order to call attention
to the
62
commercial character of the criterion chosen by this Article.
The "commercial character of the criterion" employed is also manifested in
section 2-615 (b), treating allocation in the event of partial limitation or capacity
to perform.
In sum, these three sections purport to vest the court with considerable
authority to apportion risk between the parties in cases involving impossibility of
performance and frustration of purpose. Reflecting an avowed effort to encourage and prescribe commercial reasonableness, the guidelines are, perforce,
vague, e.g., "impracticable," "basic assumption." This is a mandate for closer
judicial supervision or regulation. As elsewhere in the Code, the purpose of this
regulation is to create a legal structure which is more consistent with business
practice and legitimate expectation. Here, however, the dominant theme does
not seem to be simply expediting business, but fairly adjusting obligations to take
account of altered circumstances.
Contract Formalities:Seal; Statute of Frauds; ParolEvidence Rule
Formalities of an almost limitless variety have been used in the making of
contracts. Both Homer and Herodotus describe a ceremonial libation which
accompanied solemn agreements. Contracting parties will today, as they have
presumably from time immemorial, "shake on it" as if the added form imported
special obligation. Professor Corbin has observed that "the small boys of today
no doubt feel the weight of an awful sanction when they say 'I cross my heart
[and hope] to die.'" As he puts it, "the keeping of promises is in the folkways
and mores of mankind" and "in the vast majority of cases they are kept and
performed without the thought of breach or necessity of enforcement." Not all
promises are enforceable, however, nor is there any historical precedent to the
contrary. One of the traditional criteria for determining enforceability has been
the form in which a promise is made or expressed.63
At common law the form par excellence was the seal, at first a wax substance attached to the document. Later, writing the word "seal" or "L.S."
(locus sigilii, place of the seal) was more common. A sealed promise was
enforceable centuries before the evolution of the doctrine of consideration. Enforceability did not derive from bargain or exchange, but precisely because of
the formal mode in which the promise was cast.
There is an impressive body of learning concerning the common law seal,
but most of this has become obsolete. By decision and statute, the seal has lost
virtually all of its former efficacy.6 4 The general abolition of the seal did not
prove an unmixed blessing, however. Many regarded the seal as a useful legal
device, if for no other reason than providing a convenient method for making
62
63

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, comment 3.
IA CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 240, at 386 (1963).

64 For a table showing the status of the seal in each jurisdiction of the United States, see
I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 219A (3d ed. 1957).
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binding gratuitous promises. It was inevitable that attention would be given
to filling the vacuum, and it was most natural to turn to that most common
of contemporary "forms," the signed writing. In 1925, largely at the instigation
of Professor Williston, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the draft of the Uniform Written Obligations Act. This
recommended statute reads:
A written release or promise hereafter made and signed by the person
releasing or promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of
consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express statement, in

any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound.65

The proposal met with a singular, and somewhat surprising, lack of success. Only
Pennsylvania has adopted and retained the act,66 and in 1943 it was redesignated,
7
quite appropriately, the Model Written Obligations Act.1
The Uniform Commercial Code, by prescribing outright abolition of the
seal in section 2-203, generally adheres to the historical pattern. Some resurgence of "contract form," however, has been ushered in by the Code. In two
instances it uses a signed writing as a substitute for consideration." In addition,
section 2-209 (1), relating to modification, rescission and waiver, states:
An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.
In effect, this is added emphasis upon form, since the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds section of article 2, section 2-201, must be satisfied if the contract
as modified is within its provisions.69
The original Statute of Frauds sections pertaining to oral contracts appear
to have been Parliamentary expressions of no confidence in the ability of courts
to prevent enforcement of promises which, in fact, had never been made. To
be sure, the judiciary was handicapped at that time. Neither the parties to the
transaction nor interested third persons were competent to testify; the power to
set aside a jury verdict was virtually nonexistent; contract law itself was largely
undeveloped. The requirement of a signed writing seemed appropriate as an
additional safeguard. This limitation on the freedom of parties to bind themselves by means of their own choosing was, evidently, not too high a price to
pay. It is somewhat surprising, however, that after the judicial handicaps which
ostensibly brought the statute into being had been remedied, the writing requirement persisted. This may be suggestive of a value that transcends the original
reasons calling for enactment of the statute. Many have thought so, including,
65

MODEL WRITTEN OBLIGATIONS ACT § 1.

69

For a penetrating treatment of this topic, see Holahan, Contract Formalities and the

66 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 6-8 (1949).
67 For a discussion of the act, see Note, The Uniform Written Obligations Act, 76 U. PA.
L. REv. 580 (1928).
68 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-107 (waiver or renunciation of claim or right after
breach); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205 (firm offer).
Uniform Commercial Code, 3 VILL. L. REv. 1 (1957).
70

Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 429-31 (1928).
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Professor Karl Llewellyn. He has written: "That statute is an amazing product.
In it de Leon might have found his secret of perpetual youth. After two
centuries and a half the statute stands, in essence, better adapted to our needs
than when it first was passed." 71 Hence, it is not to be wondered that the Code
contains Statute of Frauds provisions, the most important of which, section
2-201, reads as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of
action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a
contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or
broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a
term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph
beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and
the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection
to its contents is given within ten days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection
(1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer
and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course
of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made
either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract
for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under
this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Sec.
2-606) .72
71 Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 747
(1931).
72 There is also a general residuary section, § 1-206, for "kinds of personal property not
otherwise covered," which sets a $5000 limit to the enforceable oral contract. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-319 (pertaining to securities); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-203
(covering security agreements).
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Professor Williston called this provision one of "the most iconoclastic in the
Code."73 He surely overstated the case here. Although there are changes, the
one overriding fact is that a writing requirement is retained for contracts for
the sale of goods in excess of five hundred dollars.
On the one hand, the memorandum requirement is liberalized considerably.
The writing need only "indicate that a contract for sale has been made," and
it is not insufficient because it "omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon."
The Uniform Sales Act requirement of a sufficient memorandum was more
demanding, and the omission or incorrect statement of term could be a fatal
flaw. Moreover, in subsection (2) the Code relaxes the signature requirement
in transactions between merchants. The special manufacture provision of subsection (3) had a counterpart in the Uniform Sales Act, but it has been liberalized somewhat.7 4 The Code also has a rather vague, but potentially important
provision, respecting admissions by a party that a contract for sale was made."5
On the other hand, the "acceptance and receipt" and "part payment"
exceptions of the Uniform Sales Act were more liberal. Any part payment, no
matter how small, or the acceptance and receipt of any part would enable a
party to enforce an oral contract in its completeness. The Code limits enforcement to only those goods for which payment has been made or which have been
received and accepted.
It would be interesting to learn the extent to which the Statute of Frauds
section effectively precludes enforcement of oral contracts." No doubt there
are many who agree with the statement attributed to Samuel Goldwyn: "An oral
contract is not worth the paper it's written on." But there certainly is much
contracting that occurs through oral communication. Since informal compulsions may dictate performance of a contract unenforceable under the Statute,
it may be that any inhibiting effect is illusory. At the same time, however,
the Statute creates confusion, if not outright injustice on occasion.
It has been observed that while the Statute of Frauds denies enforcement
to agreements actually made, the parol evidence rule compels enforcement of
agreements not made. The commercial utility of the parol evidence rule seems
more evident, however. In any event, regardless of the actual impact of the rule,
it certainly was not designed to frustrate the intentions of the contracting
parties. To the contrary, according to orthodox statement of the rule, it is not
73 Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv. L.
R.v. 561, 573 (1950).
74 The Code omits the Uniform Sales Act requirement that the item be manufactured
by the seller especially for the buyer. For the exception to be operative, however, the seller
must have "made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement."

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(3) (a).

75 The critical question, as yet unanswered, is whether the defendant can be obliged to
deny the oral agreement before he can take advantage of the statutory defense. 1 HAWCLAND,
A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 29-30 (1964). See Stevens,
Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355 (1952).
76 There have been, unfortunately, too few efforts to appraise the impact of law upon
commercial practice and vice versa. Perhaps the gap will be closed as investigating techniques
are perfected and the fruitfulness of such endeavors comes to be appreciated. Certainly a
comprehensive law that purports to reflect existent business practices in great measure would
be illuminated by such investigation. The value is evident in studies of this type that have
been undertaken. See, e.g., Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations inBusiness: A Preliminary

Study, 28
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REV. 55 (1963).
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applicable unless the court finds the parties intended the writing as a complete
integration or final expression of their agreement. Section 2-202 of the Code
does not deviate from this basic approach:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms
as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or
supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or
by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
Professor Corbin expressed the view that both the Statute of Frauds and
the parol evidence rule "may have done more harm than good," maintaining
that "both are attempts to determine justice and the truth by a mechanistic
device and thus evidence a distrust of the capacity of courts and juries to weigh
human credibility." 7 In its treatment of parol or extrinsic evidence, however,
the Code permits the writing ("intended by the parties as the final expression of
their agreement") to be explained or supplemented by course of dealing, usage
of trade and course of performance. It also allows evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Thus, the Code
escapes much of the criticism lodged against the strictness of a large segment of
prior judicial opinion."8
Warranty Obligation of Seller: Approaching Strict Product Liability
Professor Williston observed that "there is no more troublesome word in the
law than the word 'warranty.' "" It may have a different meaning in one area of
law than in another; even within a single area sharply divergent meanings have
emerged in the cases. Originally an action on a warranty against a seller of
goods was regarded as an action of deceit, a tort; not until 1778 does there
appear to have been a reported case of a warranty action brought in assumpsit. 0
Thereafter, courts came to assimilate warranty to contract. In recent years,
however, the tort origins have been increasingly emphasized, particularly as the
"assault upon the citadel of privity" has been vigorously carried forward.8 It
77 Corbin, The Parol Ezhidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 609 (1944).
78 See King, The New Conceptualism of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 30, 58-62 (1965).
79 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 181, at 463 (rev. ed. 1948).
80 1 id. § 195, at 502.
81 The dramatic developments in this area have been told often and well, e.g., Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 DUQUESNE U.L. Rrv. 1 (1963).
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has also been urged that the evolving "product liability" law demands a view
82
of warranty as sui generis, unfettered by either contract or tort antecedents.
The Uniform Commercial Code's delineation of the warranty obligation
of a seller of goods is a continuation of the development under the common law
and the Uniform Sales Act. A number of significant changes have been made,
however. The general effect of Code innovation will be to assist somewhat the
on-going transformation from caveat emptor to caveat venditor.
Section 2-313 applies to the express warranty of quality:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely that seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Under the Uniform Sales Act, reliance by the buyer was a necessary requisite
of express warranty.83 The Code makes no explicit reference to reliance, and it
is questionable to what extent, if any, the "basis of the bargain!' element implicitly incorporates such requirement.84 It does seem clear that the Code does
not require a showing that the purchase was induced by the affirmation or
promise. Indeed, the official comments suggest that an express warranty may
85
be predicated upon statements made after the deal is closed. In sum, the probable
impact will be to broaden the area of obligation.
82 Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTRE
503 (1964).
83

UNIFORM SALES ACT § ,12:
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501,

Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods isan
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce
the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying
thereon...
84 It isProfessor Hawkland's opinion that the "basis of the bargain" requirement is "apparently the same as the 'reliance' requirement of section 12 of the U.S.A." 1 HAWKLAND,
op. cit. supra note 75, at 58 (1964). Others insist that the Code has severely downgraded, if
not eliminated, the reliance element. See, e.g., Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial
Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281, 284-85 (1961).
85 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 7.
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The Code preserves the designation "implied warranty" for those obligations which do not ostensibly rest upon manifestations of the parties but are
more obviously implied by law. Historically, the pattern here is familiar initially, there is a disregard of intentions not expressed in words, but this evolves
to an approach which recognizes implied meanings. In short, obligations are
constructed. The important implied warranty of merchantability is described
in section 2-314:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among
all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
As it did under the Uniform Sales Act, this obligation contains a class limitation. Under section 15(2) of that act it applied to "a seller who deals in goods
of that description," and under the Code it applies to a "seller who is a merchant
with respect to the goods of that kind." The Code, however, dispenses with the
Sales Act requirement that the goods be "bought by description." It elaborates
upon minimum standards of merchantability, and in subsection (3) suggests
the possibility of other implied warranties arising from "course of conduct or
usage of trade."
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Section 2-315 of the Code provides for the implied warranty-of fitness
for a particular purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable-goods,
there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
The most notable innovation here is the elimination of the trade name exception. The existence of a patent or other trade name "is only one of the facts
to be considered on the question of whether the buyer actually relied on the
seller, but is not of itself decisive of the issue.""6
The warranty obligations of the Uniform Sales Act were couched in terms
of a seller being obligated to his buyer. Despite this apparent adherence to a
regime of warranty limiting recovery to those in privity, the courts were able,
through various methods, to expand the coverage, justifying Cardozo's classic
remark: "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days
apace."' It was of course, to be expected that a new codification of sales
warranties would have to address this matter. The result is an obvious compromise. The Code extends horizontal privity, affording protection to some who
are not actually purchasers, but does nothing about the problem of vertical
privity. Section 2-318 reads:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to"a'y natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach
of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section.
Taking cognizance of the judicial assaults upon privity, however, the drafters
appended the following comment:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section
is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend
to other persons in the distributive chain.1s
Section 2-318 is a forceful reminder of the formidable difficulties involved
in securing general approval of a comprehensive commercial code. The Code
avoids the problem instead of attempting a definitive resolution. The treatment
is sketchy, piecemeal and, in all likelihood, provisional. The classification-of
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, comment 5.
87 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
88 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, comment 3.
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"third party beneficiaries" is quite arbitrary. Why guest in the home, for example, but not in the family automobile? Why a house guest, but not an employee? Moreover, the Code fails to grapple at all with the issue of vertical
privity, let alone related problems, such as indemnification among those in the
distributive chain.
One writer, observing the restriction of the class of potential plaintiffs,
as well as the failure to enlarge the class of potential defendants, maintains that
"section 2-318 has given rebirth to the privity of contract doctrine."89 This
is highly unlikely. Indeed, the section is not likely to have much solid impact
at all, apart from extending recovery to the limited class in those jurisdictions
more or less adhering to the strictness of the privity bar. In the past few years
the courts have begun to pre-empt the field, with far-reaching opinions calculated to reorient the entire subject of a seller's liability for defects in goods sold
to those not in privity. The most dramatic breakthrough was Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,9" decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1960.
Subsequent decisions by the highest courts in New York,9" California,92 Illinois9"
and Michigan?4 are indicative of the vast change that is occurring. There may
well be an emerging consensus which will delineate a strict liability in tort for
sellers of goods,9" rendering such statutory provisions as section 2-318 virtually
obsolete."
89 Freedman, Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 PRAc. LAw. 49,
55 (1964).
90 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
91 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
92 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
93 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
.94 Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
95 Reflecting the change of attitude which has taken place, both in the decided cases and
the legal literature generally, the second edition of the Restatement of Torts articulates a rule
of strict tort liability. Section 402A, entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer," reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
'(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SEco"N), TORTS § 402A (1965).
96 A divergence may occur in the few jurisdictions (Colorado, Virginia and Wyoming)
which have, in adopting the Code, altered § 2-318 so as to enlarge the warranty obligation
significantly. CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 155-2-318 (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-654.3
(Supp. 1964); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-318 (Supp. 1965). California did not enact § 2318 on the grounds that it might restrict the already developed case law in that state. CAL.
COMM. CODE § 2318 & comment. The Virginia statute is a good example of the enlargement
of the obligation:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action
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In a decision allowing recovery to a nonpurchaser against the manufacturer,
Judge Traynor decisively stated that the action did not derive from statute, i.e.,
from a sale of goods warranty:
... ihe liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by
the law of strict liability in tort... The purpose of such liability is to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than
by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.9 7
To the extent that this attitude becomes dominant, the range of Code influence
will be constricted and, in all likelihood, confined to commercial transactions
where the contending parties deal directly with each other. The judicial shift
to strict liability in tort will also have repercussions in other areas which are at
least partially covered by the Code, e.g., limitation or disclaimer of liability.
If the warranty obligation is assimilated to contract law, there is little difficulty in supporting a power to limit or disclaim that obligation. So viewed, the
power of disclaimer is simply an attribute of freedom of contract generally. To
the extent the liability is seen as being created more formally "by operation of
law" disclaimer or limitation by agreement will be discouraged.
In the 1952 edition of the Code, section 2-316(1) rendered inoperative
any attempt to disclaim an express warranty. The provision read simply: "If
the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative."
However, in the 1958 edition, carried forward in the 1962 official text, this
terse language was replaced with the following:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the
provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202)
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable.
It is probable, but not certain, that the revised language will be interpreted so
as to accomplish the evident legislative purpose clearly manifest in the original
text. Even if this is true, it will still be possible to limit the effect of the express
warranty. Section 2-316(4) reads:
brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for breach
of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not
purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected
by the goods; however, this section shall not be construed to affect any litigation
pending at its effective date.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1964). For a perceptive analysis of this statute, in which
the author compares the Virginia approach (the same as the Code, but with abolition of the

privity defense) with that of the second edition of the Restatement of Torts (strict liability),

see Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. Rav. 804 (1965).
97 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377 P.2d 897, 901

(1962).
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Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with
the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on
contractual modification of remedy (Section 2-718 and 2-719).
Subsection (3) of section 2-719 is of special pertinence:
. Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages
for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
The foregoing is applicable as well to the disclaimer of an implied warranty of
quality, which is treated in section 2-316(2) and (3):
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by
a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties
of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all
faults" or other language which in common understanding
calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering the contract has examined
the goods or the sample model as fully as he desired or has
refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty
with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
These subsections purport to permit disclaimer or modification but prescribe certain methods which must be observed in so doing. For the most part
the statutory effort here is to protect the buyer from surprise by requiring conspicuous language. The area of paramount concern today, however, involves
the power, if any, to limit liability as to those not in privity. Section 2-318,
entitled Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied, extends
protection to "any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home.

.

." and concludes: "A seller may not exclude
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or limit the operation of this section." Does this sentence mean that a disclaimer
effective as to the immediate purchaser would not, for example, bar recovery by
one "who is a guest in his home"? If the theory of section 2-318 is that of
third party beneficiary, as the title would indicate, it would seem that the rights
of the beneficiary, if any, would be no greater than those of the immediate purchaser. Evidently this was the intention of the drafters, as attested by official
commentary to the section:
The last sentence of this section does not mean that a seller is precluded
from excluding or disclaiming a warranty which might otherwise arise in
connection with the sale provided such exclusion or modification is permitted by Section 2-316. Nor does that sentence preclude the seller from
limiting the remedies of his own buyer and of any beneficiaries, in any
manner provided in Sections 2-718 and 2-719. To the extent that the
contract of sale contains provisions under which warranties are excluded
or modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such provisions are equally
operative against beneficiaries of warranties under this section. What this
last sentence forbids is exclusion of liability by the seller to the persons to
whom the warranties which he has made to his buyer would extend under
this section.98
A number of difficulties arise because the rationale for modification and
disclaimer breaks down with regard to those persons who do not assent (actually
or apparently) to the limitation. Although it may be thought desirable to permit
the parties broad freedom to adjust rights and duties between themselves respecting the quality of goods sold, the supporting reasons are inappropriate as
to those who have exercised no choice in the matter. Inevitably, the rights of
this latter group must be defined, and in so doing the courts or legislatures must
make normative judgments. It will not do to say simply that it is a matter
which can be determined by agreement of the parties themselves. Just as in
the matter of privity, the Code does not really address the problem in its full
dimensions. Predictably, the relevant Code provisions are not likely to be very
influential.
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., " a California case, may be a precursor
of things to come. An automobile retailer claimed to be insulated from liability
to a purchaser and a passenger (purchaser's sister) in the automobile because
of a limitation of warranty provision in the contract of sale. Speaking for the
court, Judge Traynor decisively rejected the argument, declaring
Since Maywood Bell [retailer] is strictly liable in tort, the fact that it
restricted its contractual liability to Vandermark [purchaser] is immaterial.
Regardless of the obligations it assumed by contract, it is subject to strict
liability in tort because it is in the business of selling automobiles, one of
which proved to be defective and caused injury to human beings.10
98
99

§ 2-318, comment 1.
37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
Id. at 900, 391 P.2d at 172. Arguably, the same result could have been reached under
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
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the Code. Section 2-719 states that "limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.. . ." But,. as in Vandermark, the strict liability in tort theory is viewed as incompatible with a power to disclaim as
to the immediate purchaser - a thesis which is questionable and which will doubtless be -chal-
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It is not surprising that the Code, given its avowed purposes, should fail
to provide definitive treatment of the rights of those parties who are not parties
to the sales transaction. Given the overall purpose of facilitating private agreements, such intervention would have been rather extraordinary. In the absence
of such treatment, the delineation of the warranty obligation will be left to the
judiciary, with such legislative requirements or guidelines as may be established
from time to time.' 0 '
Unconscionability: Policing Contracts
It is evident that the "agreement" which the law recognizes and purports
to implement is not solely the creation of the parties to the transaction. The
law itself will supply components, reflecting normative judgments of courts. Gaps
are filled, conditions constructed, and so on. Through it all the courts seldom,
if ever, make an outright disavowal of an intent to carry out what, on the basis
of outward manifestation, the parties intended or as reasonable men would
likely have intended had they given attention to the matter. Autonomy is not
challenged in theory, however much the court, in fact, "makes the contract for
the parties." But there are exceptions, such as the regulatory aspect of the warranty sections. The most notable exception in the Code is section 2-302, pertaining to the unconscionable contract or clause:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder
of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
The statutory purpose is regulatory according to official commentary:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police
explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable.... The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
lenged repeatedly - there is no comparable difficulty in proscribing attempts to limit liability
to nonassenting third persons. For elaboration of the problems in reconciling strict tort doctrine %'ith Code warranty provisions, see Rapson, Products Liability Under ParallelDoctrines:
Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS
L. Rnv. 692 (1965); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication
Barriers, 17 W. Rns. L. REv. 5 (1965); Comment, Manufacturers Liability to Remote Purchasersfor,"Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract? 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 539 (1966).
101 For elaboration upon the regulatory aspect of warranty, see Note, Economic Institutions and Value Survey: The Consumer in the Marketplace-A Survey of the Law of Informed
Buying, 38 NOTRE DAMe LAWYER 555, 602 (1963).
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clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.... The
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise ...
and not
of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
10 2
power.
What, precisely, is this statutory mandate? Is it simply a restatement of
antecedent case law concerning instances of "over-reaching," "suprise," "deceptive fine print clauses" and the like, where the reality of voluntary assent is
lacking? Or axe courts encouraged to evaluate the agreed-upon terms with a
view of helping to assure a "fair exchange"?
It is clear that this section raises questions of fundamental import. One
such issue is whether courts should undertake to protect parties from "bad
bargains." This is a classic policy question which must be confronted in every
legal system. The standard response of the common law is that apart from
instances where there is some impropriety involved, e.g., where a promise is
procured through fraud or duress, the courts take a "hands off" attitude. They
insist that there be an actual bargain struck by the parties, but beyond this they
will not, in traditional language, "inquire into the adequacy of the consideration." This has been regarded as a corollary of freedom of contract, buttressed
by laissez-faire economics. Reflecting this approach, the Restatement of Contracts states flatly that "the relative values of a promise and the consideration
for it, do not affect the sufficiency of consideration."'0"
At the other pole was the general medieval attitude, influenced in part by
Roman law antecedents, which sought to insure equivalency of value in all
exchanges. Such concepts as "just price" were formulated to inhibit unfair
advantage in bargaining, even where the disadvantage arose from inadvertence,
inexperience or carelessness.'0 4 Under the doctrine of laesio enormis a vendor
could rescind a transaction where the price was less than one-half the value
of the goods. This was limited to real estate transactions under Roman law,
but extended to other areas by the canonists. There are some vestiges of the
In
lesion doctrine in civil law countries, but the trend has been away from it.'
contrast, American courts are departing from the strict common law doctrine.
Inadequacy, as such, is rarely an express reason for relief from a bargain, but
it may be grounds for denying specific performance. It may serve as a wedge
§ 2-302, comment 1.
§ 81 (1932). The following typifies the judicial attitude:
Appellant's argument that the contract should not be enforced because the real
estate was worth much more than the purchase price named in the agreement is,
likewise, without merit.... It is the general rule that inadequacy of consideration,
exorbitance of price or improvidence in a contract will not, in the absence of fraud,
constitute a defense .... The evidence does not show any fraud or bad faith on the
part of the appellees. While the appellant indicates that she was tired and ill at the
time of transaction, the nature of her illness was not disclosed, it does not appear
that her mental faculties were impaired, and it is nowhere contended that she was
not competent to contract. Under such circumstances, it is not inequitable or unjust
to require appellant to do what she agreed to do.
Hotze v. Schlanser, 410 Ill. 265, 270, 102 N.E.2d 131, 133-34 (1951).
104 It has been suggested that "just price" in practice more closely approximated current
market price than doctrinal formulation would indicate. See de Roover, The Concept of'the
Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy, 18 J.ECONOMIC HISTORY 418 (1958).
105 See, e.g., AMos & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 163-65 (2d ed. 1963).
102
103
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whereby a court will carefully scrutinize the bargaining process. Thus, it may
be that a low price is seen as evidence of impropriety, as a "badge of fraud."
Similarly, the court may be more easily persuaded to relieve because of mutual
mistake or duress. The concept of duress has, in recent times, been employed in
an ever-increasing variety of situations."0 8 In addition, courts have demonstrated
great concern over contracts of adhesion, illustrated by Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. The New Jersey Supreme Court cited section 2-302 of the Code
in its comprehensive opinion invalidating the disclaimer of warranty features
of the then standard warranty of the Automobile Manufactuers Assocation.' 7
The sparsity of reported litigation helped convince one authority that
this section would not effect radical change. Professor Hawkland, observing that
"not one single case involving unconscionability has been decided yet in any
of the states which have adopted the U.C.C.,"'' 8 insists that "in the heat generated by this dispute, some of the opponents and proponents of section 2-302
have failed to comprehend that the provision is designed only to permit the
courts to do openly what they have been doing for many years in a semi-covert
way. 1 0 9 Noting that the case illustrations in the comments accompanying
section 2-302 involve, for the most part, warranty disclaimers and limitations
of remedies, he concludes:
They [most of the case illustrations] indicate, therefore, two flaccid areas
upon which the contract draftsman must focus. The remainder of the cases
are concerned with adhesive contracts. These contracts must be carefully
prepared and reviewed for fairness. If they are not oppressive and do
not surprise, they should be sustained. (All italicized in original.) 10
Section 2-302 was used as "persuasive authority" in Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Go.,"' a recent case arising in the District of Columbia which
probably represents the high water mark for the unconscionability doctrine
to date. A furniture retailer "sold" items pursuant to terms stipulated in
printed form contracts purporting to lease the items for a stipulated monthly
rental. Title to an item was to remain with the retailer until the total of all
monthly payments made equalled the stated price, at which time purchaser
would take title. The retailer could repossess in the event of a default in the
payment of any monthly installment.
The contract specified further that
the amount of each periodical installment payment to be made by [purchaser]
to the Company under this present lease shall be inclusive of and not in
addition to the amount of each installment payment to be made by
[purchaser] under such prior leases, bills or accounts; and all payments now
and hereafter made by [purchaser] shall be credited pro rata on all out106
107
108
109
110
111

Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 Micn. L. Rlv. 253 (1947).
32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
1 HAWKLAND, Op. cit. supra note 75, at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47-48.
350 F.2d 445 (1965).
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standing leases, bill and accounts due the Company by [purchaser] at the
time each such payment is made. (Emphasis added by court.) 112
The court said:
The effect of this rather obscure provision was to keep a balance due on every
item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever purchased,
was liquidated. As a result, the debt incurred at the time of purchase of
each item was secured by the right to repossess all the items previously
purchased by the same purchaser, and each new item purchased automatically 3became subject to a security interest arising out of the previous
dealings."1
This appeal was a consolidation of two cases involving the same retailer
and the same essential fact pattern. In one of the cases, the customer, Ora Lee
Williams (known to the seller as a relief recipient with seven dependents to
support on a $218 monthly government stipend) purchased a stereo set on April
17, 1962, for a stated price of $514.95. She defaulted shortly thereafter and the
seller sought to replevy all items purchased since December, 1957. At the time
of the April, 1962, purchase a balance of $164 was still owing from prior
purchases. The total of all the purchases made over the years in question came
to $1800. The total payments amounted to $1400.
Judge Wright, speaking for the majority, observed that congressional
enactment of the Code occurred subsequent to the contracts in question. Nonetheless, in view of the absence of prior authority in the District of Columbia on
the precise point, the court held "the congressional adoption of § 2-302 persuasive authority for following the rationale of the cases from which the section
is explicitly derived."" 4 "Accordingly," it was concluded, "we hold that where
the element of unconscionability is present at the time a contract is made, the
contract should not be enforced.""' 5
The concept of unconscionability was elaborated upon as follows:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a
meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined
by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In
many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality
of bargaining power. [Citation made to Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.] The manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to
this consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious
education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the
terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of
fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? Ordinarily, one who
signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be held to
assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party
of little bargaining power and hence little real choice, signs a commercially
112
113
114
115

Id. at 447.
Ibid.
Id. at 449.
Ibid.
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unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly
likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent,
was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the
terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and
the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair
that enforcement should be withheld.
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern must
be with the terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances
existing when the contract was made. The test is not simple, nor can it
be mechanically applied. The terms are to be considered "in the light of
the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the
particular trade or case." Corbin suggests the test as being whether the
terms are "so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores
and business practices of the time and place." . . . We think this formulation

correctly states the test to be applied in those cases where no meaningful
choice was exercised upon entering the contract. (Footnotes omitted.)""'
Since the trial court did not feel that enforcement could be refused, no
findings were made on the possible unconscionability in the instant cases. Hence,
the court did not believe the record sufficient for decision as a matter of law.
The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Judge Danaher, dissenting, supported the lower court's call for congressional consideration of "corrective legislation to protect the public from such
'
But he urged "a
exploitive contracts as were utilized in the case at bar."117
cautious approach to any such problem, particularly since the law for so long
has allowed parties such great latitude in making their own contracts.""' 8 He
concluded, "I dare say there must annually be thousands upon thousands of
installment credit transactions in this jurisdiction, and one can only speculate
as to the effect the decision in these cases will have.""' 9
Unconscionability doctrine is obviously heady stuff, suggesting the need for
judicial restraint in the exercise of its "police power." Each case, however, need
not be resolved on a strictly ad hoc basis. There are guidelines. There is the older
judicial delineation, particularly reflected in equity cases, and the overriding
emphasis in the Code upon commercial practice as evidentiary of commercial
reasonableness. The early returns and absence thereof indicate that the potentially
broad mandate of section 2-302 will receive a rather narrow judicial construction. Even Williams can be viewed as consistent with a more narrow
interpretation, which would confine the effect of the section to the invalidation
of-in the characterization of the dissenting judge-manifestly "oppressive"
or "exploitive" provisions not shown to have been consciously assented to and
appearing in a context strongly suggestive of impropriety in the bargaining
process.

20

116 Id. at 449-50.
117 Id. at 450.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 It is predictable that consumer protection legislation will in many instances obviate the
need for reliance upon § 2-302 in order to reach certain flagrant abuses. American Home
Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964), is illustrative. A written
home improvement contract violated the applicable New Hampshire statute in that finance
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Policy

Despite some regulatory aspects wherein private choice is subordinated to
public policy, the dominant theme of the Code is respect for private choice as to
both the existence and the content of legal relationships. It does indeed afford
"an impressive view of a large sphere of commercial dealing that remains
free."'21 In this part of the article additional provisions will be examined in the
light of this apparent overall purpose. These provisions reflect Code policies
seemingly inconsistent with a commitment to private autonomy. Attention will
be given to the emergence in the Code of a kind of professional merchant status,
to the prescription of forms enabling parties to attain desired ends but restricting
the means available, and to the promotion of assignment and negotiation in the
interest of promoting the free flow of commerce.
(Freedom of) Contract and (Professional) Status
Section 1-203 of the Code imposes upon contracting parties an obligation of good faith: "every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." "Good faith," as defined in section 1-201(19), "means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Additionally, under the sales article, "'Good faith' in the
case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
com1 22
mercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." (Emphasis added.)
The general imposition of a requirement of good faith, in the sense of an
obligation to be honest, is actually no more than what many courts have been
23
willing to read into an agreement without explicit direction of the parties.
The very notion of a legal relationship existing between parties implies that each
must act in a way consistent with that relationship. It is, of course, a legally
imposed requirement but it does no more than demand an observance of conduct presumably contemplated. For the merchant, however, the additional requirement of article 2 goes beyond this minimum. The concept of good faith
for the merchant is said to encompass the "observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." Nowhere in the Code is "fair dealing in
the trade" defined, nor are "reasonable commercial standards" articulated. It
devolves upon the judiciary to make these determinations, and this power could
be very far reaching. Coupled with the mandate in section 2-302 "to police
21 4
explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable,'
the result is an invitation to the courts to scrutinize transactions more closely than
charges were not specified. This was held to bar the plaintiff from recovery on the contract,
although the court also mentioned § 2-302 as "another and independent reason" for the
result reached. Id. at 439, 201 A.2d at 888.
121 HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 97 (1961).
122 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(1)(b).
123 For example:
In every- contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there
exists an implied covenant of, good faith and fair dealing.
Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 771, 128 P.2d 665, 677
(1942).
124 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, comment 1.
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they might otherwise be inclined. Predictably, there will be constant pressure
upon the courts to implement this power.
Courts need not and should not approach these questions as if they had a
tabula rasa. Under section 2-302, when a claim of unconscionability is asserted as to a contract or any clause thereof, "the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose
and effect." The statement of obligation in terms of "reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade," suggests that norms are to be derived from
the business community, such as practice, custom and usage. Although the
obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by the
Code may not be disclaimed by agreement, the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligation is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable."2 5
It said that the law should be no respecter of persons," 0 but there are
numerous instances where select persons or groups are singled out for either a
grant of special privilege or the imposition of special obligation."2
The higher
standard of good faith for a merchant is illustrative and constitutes an important
feature of the Code. It has no general counterpart in either the common law
or prior codifications, but it is not unprecedented. 2 ' The general effect is to
125 It may come about that the imposition of a good faith term will be the very thing that
will save some agreements from a condemnation of unconscionability. It is doubtful, for instance, whether Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948), an acknowledged
antecedent of § 2-302, would have been decided as it was if the court had not been able to
construct, by ignoring any element of presumed good faith in performance, a horrendous hypothetical of what "might be done" pursuant to the agreement. See UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-302, comment 1.
126 "The rules of law should depend upon the facts and the nature of the transaction, and
not upon the particular persons involved." Hall, Article 2--Sales-"From Status to Contract"?
1952 Wis. L. Rlv. 209, 212.
127
If we look narrowly at our legal tradition we shall see that it has two characteristics. On the one hand, it is characterized by an extreme individualism. A foreign
observer has said that its distinguishing marks are "unlimited valuation of individual
liberty and respect for individual property." It is concerned not with social righteousness but with individual rights.... On the other hand, it is characterized by another
element tending in quite another direction; a -tendency to affix duties and liabilities
independently of the will of those bound, to look to relations rather than to legal
transactions as the basis of legal consequences, and to impose both liabilities and
disabilities upon those standing in certain relations as members of a class rather than
upon individuals.
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 13-14 (1921).
128 In answering criticism of those who objected that different rules were set up for persons
regarded as "merchants," Professor Llewellyn pointed to the older Law Merchant tradition
and its partial assimilation into the common law under the aegis, particularly, of Lord Mansfield. Professor LIewellyn put it this way:
These are rules which lay upon a person professionally involved in the field
those obligations which should properly be laid upon persons. The practice along
this line is ancient, not new. Before Lord Mansfield there were merchants' courts
which made merchants, and only merchants, answer to the proper obligations of
merchants. Lord Mansfield incorporated into the common law, if one cares to really
examine the cases, not "The Law Merchant," but "The Law of Merchants' Peculiar
Obligations." . . . The whole law, developed now over more than a hundred years,
on foreign trade terms and letters of credit - and the whole current effort to establish by bankers' and merchants' negotiation "uniform" interpretations and clauses
and "customs" - and the whole current successful movement to build, associationwise, "standard terms" - all of these rest on a vital need for distinguishing merchants
from housewives and from farmers and from mere lawyers.
[1954] 1 N.Y. LAW REvIsioN ComM'N ANN. REP. 107-08. Cf. Schlesinger, The Uniform
Commercial Code in the Light of Comparative Law, 1 INTER-AMERCAN L. Rxv. 11 (1959).
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demand a higher standard of performance from a "merchant," defined broadly as:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may
be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge
or skill.'"
...

One who fits this category of "a professional in business" assumes a status,
the attributes of which are particularized in various Code sections. A few of
these have already been noted, e.g., section 2-205 ("firm offer"), section 2-207
(additional terms of "acceptance" becoming part of contract), section 2-201
(confirmatory memorandum binding on recipient under Statute of Frauds), "'
section 2-314(1) (implied warranty of merchantability) 1"' and section

2-609(2) (reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and adequacy of any assurance offered to be determined according to commercial standards). Section
2-603 specifies the duties of a merchant with respect to rightfully rejected goods.
When the seller has no agent or place of business at the market of rejection a
merchant buyer is "under a duty after rejection of goods in his possession or
control to follow any reasonable instructions received from the seller with respect to the goods and in the absence of such instructions to make reasonable
efforts to sell them for the seller's account if they are perishable or threaten to
decline in value speedily."'3 2

A related provision applies to a buyer's waiver of objections by failure to
particularize defects. Between merchants, a buyer who has rejected goods may not
rely on an unstated defect that is ascertainable by reasonable inspection to justify
rejection or to establish breach when the seller "has after rejection made a
request in writing for a full and final written statement of all defects on which
the buyer proposes to rely."'3 3
Section 2-509, pertaining to risk of loss in the absence of breach, differ129

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

133

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-104(1).

130 Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209(2), which applies to signed agreements excluding modification or rescission except by a signed writing.
131 Of comparable import is UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-312(3), which pertains to
warranty against infringement:
Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods
of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of
any third person by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must hold the seller harmless against any such claim which arises
out of compliance with the specifications.
132 UNrFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-603(1). However, "instructions are not reasonable
if on demand indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming." Ibid. In addition,
When the buyer sells goods under subsection (1), he is entitled to reimbursement
from the seller or out of the proceeds for reasonable expenses of caring for and selling
them, and if the expenses include no selling commission then to such commission as
is usual in the trade or if there is none to a reasonable sum not exceeding ten per cent
on the gross proceeds.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-603(2). Finally, in complying with this section, "the buyer
is held only to good faith." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-603(3). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-327(1)(c), relative to a merchant buyer's duty to follow reasonable
instructions in returning goods delivered on approval.

§ 2-605(1) (b).
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entiates the merchant in an important respect. Unless the contract requires or
auhorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier or the goods are held by a
bailee to be delivered without being moved, "the risk of loss passes to the buyer
on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the risk passes
to the buyer on tender of delivery." ' The rationale is convincing:
The underlying theory of this rule is that a merchant who is to make
physical delivery at his own place continues meanwhile to control the goods
and can be expected to insure his interest in them. The buyer, on the other
hand, has no control of the goods and it is extremely unlikely that he will
carry insurance on goods not yet in his possessioni 3s'
These special instances do not add up to a general pattern of mercantile
regulation. Each is carefully tailored to meet a specific problem, and taken
singly or in combination, they fall far short of reorienting commercial obligation
toward some emerging professional status. If they are illustrative of how the
broader judicial mandates respecting unconscionable contracts and reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade are to be implemented, the
traditional respect for private autonomy will not be undermined.""8
Prescribed Forms and Prescribed Terms
X, desiring to give his ring to Z, says, in the presence of witnesses: "I
hereby give you, Z, this ring; you are now the owner of it." Does Z own the
ring? No. Similarly, X says: "I hereby promise to give you this ring, hereby
waiving any necessity for consideration." Is his promise binding? No. Or X
says to Z, again in the presence of witnesses: "I hereby will this ring to you;
you are to be the owner of it at my death." Upon the death of X, does Z thereby
become owner of ring? No.
In none of these cases was there an overriding policy precluding X from
accomplishing his objective, but each expression of intention was not, of itself,
sufficient to have the desired juristic effect. There are certain prescribed formalities which must be observed if the desired end is to be attained. In the
first case, typically, there must be delivery, in the second, consideration, in the
last case, compliance with the applicable Statute of Wills.
Superficially, the insistence upon forms might seem a limitation of private
autonomy. So long as the formalities are easy to observe and are made known
to potential users, however, their prescription enhances a party's ability to create legal relations. Use of a form guarantees the accomplishment of the intended
objective; informal expression is more susceptible to the vagaries of judicial
134 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-509(3).
135 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-509, comment 3. There are three other sections of
article 2 which contain special rules for merchants, but they do not stipulate any increase in
obligations. Two of these, §§ 2-326 & -- 402(2), were drafted with the rights of creditors in
mind. The other, § 2-403(2), is a notable innovation covering the entrustment of goods to
a merchant and his power to transfer title to third persons. For discussion of this section in
another context, see text accompanying note 159 infra.
136 For a discussion of other Code provisions which, to a degree, impose higher standards
("reasonable commercial standards") upon "professional" parties, e.g., warehousemen, carriers
and banks, see Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MODERN L.
REv. 167, 168-70 (1964).
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interpretation."3 7 Moreover, the form can have a salutary effect in that the
possibility of fraud or other impropriety may be diminished to the extent that
an external corroborative event is demanded.
One of the most formal instruments known to the law is the negotiable instrument. The extraordinary legal effect given to a negotiable instrument, whereby
good faith purchasers are insulated against prior claims and defenses, demands
careful delineation by law of the types of instruments which qualify. Not surprisingly, the law has evolved certain formal requisites, such as the requirements
of payment to order or bearer, of a sum certain and at a definite time. Section
3-104(1) of the Code continues this tradition:
Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation
or power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized
by this Article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
These formal requisites are not absolute prerequisites of negotiability, however.
The provision covers only those negotiable instruments "within this Article."
Other sections in the Code treat the negotiability of investment paper (article
8) and commodity paper (article 7, documents of title). Beyond this there is
the possibility of judicial recognition of new types of paper which commercial
practice may develop. The phrase "within this Article," according to Code
commentary, "leaves open the possibility that some writings may be made negotiable by other statutes or by judicial decision.""'8
Chief Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court insisted in 1846
that a negotiable instrument must be a "courier without luggage,"' 39 and countless judges have repeated this as an ideal. But just as the emergence of the
137

See Friedman, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw.

U.L. REv. 751 (1965).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104, comment 1. A leading authority, Professor
138
William Britton, urged that the language "within this Article" be stricken. As he saw it:
The prospective course of decision over twenty-five or fifty years under the
proposed policy of having nonconforming instruments negotiable, in whole or in part,
if they obtain judicial recognition, is of course conjectural. It is possible that the
change might raise only a ripple; yet it might stir up winds strong enough to wreck
the docks and shift the channel in this stream of the law. The proposal to cut the
dyke and let the waters of negotiability flow out in any and all directions could well
create legal swamps for miles around the banks.
Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiabiity-TheNegotiable Instruments Law Compared With
the Proposed Commercil Code, 26 Rocny MT. L. lmv. 1, 4 (1953). See UNIFORM1 ComCon § 9-206, relative to the possibility of "negotiability by contract."
MERcL
139 Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846).
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negotiable instrument in the common law was brought about by the pressure
of "Lombard Street dictating to Westminster Hall," so statute and judicial
opinion has responded to apparent business demands by permitting a considerable
amount of luggage.'
If anything, the Code permits more than the prior codification. Most significant is the allowance of all types of acceleration clauses.
Section 3-105(1) states in part: "An instrument is payable at a definite time
if by its terms it is payable... (c) at a definite time subject to any acceleration .

. . ."

Moreover, under section 3-105, "a promise or order otherwise

unconditional is not made conditional by the fact that the instrument . . . (c)
refers to or states that it arises out of a separate agreement or refers to a separate
agreement for rights as to prepayment or acceleration ... "141
The effect of the Code provisions touching the formal requisites for negotiable commercial paper is to provide a comparatively easy form for those desiring the use of such commercial paper. A similar appraisal may be made of
the Code treatment of investment securities,' 4 documents of title 43 and letters
of credit.' 44 Finally, the same intelligent prescription of usable forms to facilitate
the accomplishment of desired objectives can be seen in article 9 (on secured
transactions), credited by many as being the most important article in the

Code."'
The unprecedented growth of commercial credit has demanded and de140 For a discussion of the situation under the Negotiable Instruments Law, see Gilmore,
The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1070-71 (1954).
141 Recall, however, that under § 1-208
a term providing that one pailty . . . may accelerate payment . . "at will" or
"when he deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed
to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the
prospect of payment or performance is impaired ...
142 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 8. The express purpose of this article is to create
'a negotiable instruments law dealing with securities," encompassing
...bearer bonds, formerly covered by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law...
registered bonds, not previously covered by any Uniform Law ... certificates of stock,
formerly provided for by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and additional types of
investment paper not now covered by any Uniform Act.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-101, comment.
The basic purpose of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code is to facilitate
the transferability in our free capital markets of instruments which fairly fall within
the definition of "security" in section 8-102. That definition is functional and is
directly related to criterion of marketability by the requirement that the instrument
be "of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly
recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment."
Israels, Stop-Transfer Procedures and the Securities Act of 1933-Addendum to Uniform
Commercial Code-Article 8, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 158 (1962) (reprinted in ABA SECTION
OF CORPORATION, BANKING

(1964)

& BUSINESS LAW, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 247
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK]).
See Guttman,

[Hereinafter cited as

Article 8-Investment Securities, 17 RUTGERS L. Ray. 136 (1962).
143 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 7. The negotiable document of title, of obvious
business utility, enables the owner to retain control of the goods while they are in possession of
a carrier or a warehouseman.
When Article 7 is compared with the prior law . .. it is apparent that the continuity with prior law is more significant than the changes are. Terminology is
recast; disputed questions are resolved; and some innovations are introduced. But
the overall picture is one of tidying up traditional concepts rather than of radical
reform.
Braucher, The Uniform Commercial Code-Documents of Title (Davenport rev.), in UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL HANDBoOx 173, 209 (1964) (original in 102 U. PA. L. Rlv. 831 '(1954)).
144 The sole formal requisite is a signed writing. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-104.
145 See, e.g., Henson, Secured Financing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 Bus.
LAW.

337 (1963)

(reprinted in

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK

257).
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pended upon legal devices calculated to insure repayment of credit extensions.
Typically, this is accomplished by making available to a creditor an opportunity
to obtain a security interest in his debtor's property. The applicable law has
evolved to heights of enormous difficulty and complexity. Article 9 undertakes
a massive task of simplification and modernization. 4 " It supersedes existing legislation dealing with such security devices as chattel mortgages, conditional sales,
trust receipts, factor's liens and assignments of accounts receivable. And while
the official comments insist that the article "sets out a comprehensive scheme
for the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures,"' 47
there is no attempt to displace regulatory legislation such as small loan and retail installment acts, measures designed to subordinate private agreement to a
policy of consumer protection. 4 In the main, the Code prescribes forms for
the facilitation of these security transactions; the other legislation undertakes,
to a much greater degree, to control and regulate the existence and content of the
transactions. The latter, for example, have detailed provisions relative to the
form of contract and prohibited practices. There are, in most instances, limitations imposed as to finance or service charges. In contrast the Code greatly
simplifies the formal requirements for the creation and perfection of such security interests.
Freedom of Assignability; Negotiability of Goods:
Promoting the Free Flow of Commerce
Since assignments are commonplace today - indeed one cannot imagine
our complex credit structure existing without them - it is difficult to understand why common law courts refused for so long to recognize the assignability
of a contract right. Legal historians have ascribed the refusal to various factors.
For example, the severe proscription of maintenance and- champerty, the unlawful interference in or purchase of an interest in another's lawsuit, helped
create a climate of judicial disfavor to the notion of one suing to enforce a right
arising out of a transaction to which he was not privy. In this respect Lord
Coke commented:
And first was observed the great wisdom and policy of the sages and
founders of our law, who have provided, that no possibility, right, title,
nor thing in action, shall be granted or assigned to strangers, for that would
be the occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits, of great oppression
of the people, and chiefly of terre-tenants, and the subversion of the due
and equal execution of justice. 49
The emphasis upon the personal relationship of the contracting parties,
146 "The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which the
immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost
and with greater certainty." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, comment. For an excellent
discussion of article 9, see SprVACK, SEcuRm TRANSACTIONS (3d ed. 1963) (published by the
Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute and the ABA).
147 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, comment.
148 "Consumer instalment sales and consumer loans present special problems of a nature
which makes special regulation of them inappropriate in a general commercial codification."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, comment.
149 Lampet's Case, 10 Coke 46b, 48a, 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997 (1612).
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discernible also in the development of third party beneficiary contracts, tended
to make the lack of privity an insurmountable obstacle to a third party's right
of action. The law merchant, however, developed a considerable body of
assignment doctrine, presumably in response to commercial demand. This indicates that the common law position might be explainable in practical rather
than theoretical terms. The state of the economy did not require the credit
stimulation afforded by the transferability of choses in action. Even where
such stimulation was necessary it was given by the law merchant.
As the economy expanded, the common law courts, spurred on by courts
of Equity, began to fashion legal doctrine which, in effect, permitted the assignment of a contract right. This was accomplished ostensibly within the framework of settled law, but actually amounted to a sharp departure from precedent. The owner of the right could appoint another his agent for collection and
agree that the latter would keep the proceeds. As time went on, even if the
transaction was formally denominated an assignment, courts would say the effect
was to create a power of attorney, enabling the "assignee" to sue in the name
of the "assignor." There were serious drawbacks to this agency evasion, however. The "assignor" could revoke the agency himself, and revocation was
effected automatically by his death or bankruptcy. To overcome this defect in
the process, litigants appealed to Equity, and characteristically, the Chancellor
responded. If the "assignee" gave value, he was treated as owner of the claim,
which ownership could not be divested by the "assignor's" attempted revocation or by his death or bankruptcy. At this point the future of assignment
doctrine was assured. Although there persisted a language which described
choses in action as assignable in Equity but not at law, the subsequent merger
of law and Equity caused even this terminology to all but disappear. The result is that the power of assignment is firmly established, and judicial attention
has been given to the implications of this power. 5 '
As would be expected, the Uniform Commercial Code opts decisively in
favor of assignability. In addition, it recognizes delegation of a duty of performance as a normal and permissible incident of a contract for the sale of
goods.'
The basic section is 2-210, which provides:
(1) A party may perform his duty through a delegate unless otherwise agreed or unless the other party has a substantial interest in having
his original promisor perform or control the acts required by the contract.
No delegation of performance relieves the party delegating of any duty to
perform or any liability for breach.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer can
be assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty
of the other party, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed on
150 FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 585-92 (1947); CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 856 (1951).
151 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-210, comment 1. For a general discussion of assignment and delegation under the Code, see Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Contract
Law: Some Selected Problems, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 836, 906-20 (1957).
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him by his contract, or impair materially his chance of obtaining return
performance. A right to damages for breach of the whole contract or a
right arising out of the assignor's due performance of his entire obligation
can be assigned despite agreement otherwise.
(3) Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary a prohibition of
assignment of "the contract" is to be construed as barring only the delegation to the assignee of the assignor's performance.
(4) An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my rights under the
contract" or an assignment in similar general terms is an assignment of
rights and unless the language or the circumstances (as in an assignment
for security) indicate the contrary, it is a delegation of performance of
the duties of the assignor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes a
promise by him to perform those duties. This promise is enforceable by
either the assignor or the other party to the original contract.
(5) The other party may treat any assignment which delegates performance as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and may without
prejudice to his rights against the assignor demand assurances from the
assignee (Section 2-609).
The Code preference for freedom of assignability can be seen most clearly
inits treatment of nonassignment clauses. Traditionally, the law has recognized
the power of the contracting parties to limit the assignability of rights by agreement."5 2 A leading decision in accord with this view is Allhusen v. Caristo
Constr. Corp., a 1952 New York case. 53 A subcontractor sought to assign the
right to payments due or to become due under a construction contract with the
general contractor. A clause in the contract provided: "The assignment by the
second party . . . [subcontractor] of this contract or any interest therein, or of
any money due or to become due by reason of the terms hereof without the
written consent of the first party . . . [general contractor] shall be void."' 54
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the position of the assignee in his
suit against the general contractor. It said that "while the courts have striven
to uphold freedom of assignability, they have not failed to recognize the concept of freedom to contract.' 5
In this instance where implementation of one freedom has a limiting effect upon another (broadly, "contract" versus "property"), the common law
favored freedom of contract. The Code, as will be seen, subordinates freedom
of contract in this instance, recognizing, in effect, that "this is not too high a

152

the

This view was embodied in the Restatement of Contracts as follows: "A right may be

subject of effective assignment unless ... (c)the assignment is prohibited by the contract

creating the right." RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 151 (1932).
153 303 N.Y. 446, 103 N.E.2d 891 (1952). See Note, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 740.
154 Id. at 449, 103 N.E.2d at 891.
155 Id. at 452, 103 N.E.2d at 893.
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price to pay56for the pragmatic necessity of furthering the utilization of financial
resources."'
Subsection (2) of 2-210, which undertakes to state what rights are assignable, begins with the words "unless otherwise agreed," inferentially recognizing
that it would be possible for the parties to control the matter by agreement. However, in the very subsection, this contractual freedom is limited: "A right to
damages for breach of the whole contract or a right arising out of the assignor's
due performance of his entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement otherwise." And the virtual coup de grace is administered in article 9. Section
9-318(4) stipulates: "A term in any contract between an account debtor and
an assignor which prohibits assignment of an account or contract right to which
they are parties is ineffective." An "account" is defined in section 9-106 as a
"right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered. . .

."

In the

same section a "contract right" is defined as a "right to payment . . .not yet
earned by performance... ." The breadth of these definitions shows the extent
to which the Code limits the rights of parties to prohibit assignability. To underscore this impression, the draftsmen added this forthright commentary:
Subsection (4) [of 9-318] breaks sharply with the older contract doctrines
by denying effectiveness to contractual terms prohibiting assignment of accounts and contract rights ....
There can be no doubt that a term prohibiting assignment of proceeds
was effective against an assignee with notice through the nineteenth century
and well into the twentieth. Section 151 of the Restatement of Contracts
(1932) so states the law without qualifications.
That rule of law has been progressively undermined by a process of
erosion which began much earlier than the cited section of the Restatement
of Contracts would suggest. The cases are legion in which courts have
construed the heart out of prohibitory or restrictive terms and held the
assignment good. The cases are not lacking where courts have flatly held
assignments valid without bothering to construe away the prohibition....
Such cases as Allhusen v. Caristo Const. Corp.... would be rejected by
this subsection.
This gradual and largely unacknowledged shift in legal doctrine has
taken place in response to economic need: as accounts and contract rights
have become the collateral which secures an ever increasing number of
financing transactions, it has been necessary to reshape the law so that these
intangibles, like negotiable instruments and negotiable documents of title,
can be freely assigned.
Subsection (4) thus states a rule of law which is widely recognized in the
cases and which corresponds to current business practices. It can be regarded
as a revolutionary departure only by those who still cherish the hope that

COmRACTS § 258, at 422 (rev. ed. 1965).
Probably the outstanding example of the commercial use of assignment is accounts
receivable financing. This means of stimulating a supply of credit has become exceedingly popular because it enables the businessman to convert what otherwise would
be dormant accounts receivable into available working capital. In this respect the
ability to assign assumes great social significance for, if our economy is fully to
realize its potential, it is essential that all sources of capital be available.
Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law: Some Selected Problems, 105 U.
PA. L. REv. 836, 909-10 (1957).
156
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we may yet return to the views entertained some two hundred years ago
by the Court of King's Bench.157
It is understandable that a major codification of commercial law would
attach a high priority to transferability of assets. It is not to be wondered that
negotiability in particular would be promoted with determination. Negotiability
expedites commercial exchange, since the purchaser is insulated from defenses
and claims of prior parties. 5
The Code seeks to implement a kind of "negotiability of goods"'5 9 to a much
greater degree than the common law or the superseded uniform acts. The key
provision is section 2-403:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or
had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires
rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable
title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.
When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser,
or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale," or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster
to a buyer in ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties
to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement
of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such
as to be larcenous under the criminal law.
157

158
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CODE

§ 9-318,

comment 4.

The triumph of the good faith purchaser has been one of the most dramatic
episodes in our legal history. In his several guises, he serves a commercial function:
he is protected not because of his praiseworthy character, but to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without elaborate investigation of property
rights and in reliance on the possession of property by one who offers it for sale or
to secure a loan.
Gilmore, supra note 140, at 1057.
159 See generally Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHm. L. Rev. 469 (1963).
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(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are
governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk-Transfers (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7).
Subsection (1) supersedes, in a decisive fashion, the older approach which
sought to effectuate the "intention" of the original owner. More often than not,
the title of the original owner was upheld as against a competing claim of a
third-party good faith purchaser. An enormous body of learning was developed,
with all sorts of subtleties, fine distinctions and refinements. The Code makes
all this obsolete. A purchaser has power to transfer title even though his transferor was deceived as to his identity, the delivery was in exchange for a check
which was later dishonored, it was agreed the transaction was to be a "cash sale"
or the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
This subsection (1) was widely acclaimed. Apart from the commercial
advantage, a degree of certainty was implanted. This was not so with respect
to subsection (2). Its sharp break with precedent has been and continues to be
a source of controversy. Many have asserted its scope to be indefensible. The
criticism often takes the form of hypothetical questions, e.g., What if X takes
a prized piece of jewelry to a store for repairs-to a "merchant who deals in
goods of that kind"-and the latter purports to sell the item to a good faith
purchaser in ordinary course of business? Who "owns" the jewelry? To say
that the purchaser now owns the jewelry is certainly to implement a "negotiability of goods" concept - perhaps with a vengeance. Professor Llewellyn,
when pressed on this matter, seemed to concede that perhaps the Code goes too
far here. In testifying before the New York Law Revision Commission he stated:
"The choice is hard, and it gives little satisfaction, either way; but the Code's
160
choice fits more comfortably into the whole body of our commercial law.'
But the provision remains. There has been no significant reported litigation concerning it; certainly the "lost family heirloom" case has not yet surfaced. Perhaps
it never will, or perhaps if it does judicial ingenuity will find a way to preserve,
in this rather special situation, the security of possession clearly guaranteed by
prior law.
III. Conclusion
When Mackenzie D. Chalmers was directed by Parliament to codify English
sales law, his mandate was to "reproduce as exactly as possible the existing
law."'' The resultant English Sale of Goods Act, enacted in 1893, reflects a
determined effort to preserve continuity with the common law. When, at the
turn of the century, Professor Williston commenced work on what was to become the Uniform Sales Act, it was understood that his statutory codification
should likewise comport with legal antecedents. In general, Professor Williston's draft followed the English statute; in several instances Lord Chalmers's
language was copied verbatim.
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Work on the Uniform Commercial Code began in the early 1940's, under
joint sponsorship of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute. The Chief Reporter was the late
Karl Llewellyn, assisted by many others from the ranks of the judiciary, the
practicing bar, the law schools and business. Unlike Chalmers and Williston,
Llewellyn and his colleagues did not feel a special need or obligation to follow
previously chartered courses. Accordingly, there are many innovations and
departures from precedent. But in a larger sense, there is remarkable continuity.'
Evidence of this continuity can be found in both the formulation of basic
policy and the specification of means of implementation. The dominant policy
remains the facilitation of commercial exchange of a type desired by the participants. The interest is in creating a framework within which private choice
can be exercised. There is no discernible overall effort to reorder commercial
activity to some preconceived pattern of social justice. Contractual freedom
remains the rule, subordination to overriding policy, the exception. When such
policy is articulated, e.g., when the concept of unconscionability or of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade is introduced, directions to
the judiciary militate against arbitrary disregard of actual or presumed intention
of the contracting parties. The judge is not to rely simply upon his own unsupported conscience, or upon his own observation of business practice or usage.
He must consider data in the record, since the Code provides explicitly for
introduction of evidence of commercial context. Nor is the judge encouraged to
take cognizance of whatever policies are, at the moment, appealing to him, e.g.,
price stability, conservation of natural resources, balance of payments or need
for temporary credit relaxation or tightening. Rather, he is to derive his norms
from statutory language and purpose, as illuminated by commercial background
and practice.
The choice of judicial implementation is itself highly significant, especially
in an age of increasing administrative execution of detailed legislative policy.
That a legislature which is determined "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions" ' should cede so much responsibility to
the courts is both a sign of confidence and an encouragement of judicial creativity' 6 4 As sketched in the official comments, the following is envisioned:
It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be
developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances
and practices....
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of
the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the
162 It has been said that "we are all conservatives-just different ancestors." As noted,
even the most striking of Code innovations are not unprecedented, e.g., special merchant obligations or standards. In particular, analogues can be found in the Law Merchant, which strongly
influenced the development of commercial law by the common law courts. For a general survey,

see
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(1904).

163 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2) (a).
164 ". . . [T]his Code has been planned to endure and to afford both the courts and the

people affected by it room to move in the best American common law tradition." (Emphasis
added.) Mentschikoff, supra note 136, at 167-68. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION:

DECIDING APPEALS

(1960).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Act as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed
narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes
and policies involved. 65
The prospects are that commercial law will enter upon a formative period.
Issues long dormant will again be debated, not only in the legislative assembly
but in the courtroom. A judicial awareness of the broad statutory mandate to
adapt and modernize will produce changes exceeding in significance even those
of the Mansfield era. Hopefully, the quality of this creativity will match that of
that great jurist, whom Holdsworth called "the greatest lawyer of the eighteenth
century."' 66 If a comparable encouragement of commercial exchange again stimulates years of economic expansion, the contribution will surely be accounted
as exceedingly great.
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102, comment 1.

166 HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 161 (1938). Edmund Burke, a contemporary, said of Mansfield:
His ideas go to the growing melioration of the law, by making its liberality
keep pace with the demands of justice, and the actual concerns of the world; not
restricting the infinitely diversified occasions of men, and the rules of natural justice,
within artificial circumscriptions, but conforming our jurisprudence to the growth
of our commerce and of our empire.
Id. at 169.

